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A Long View of the Senate’s Influence over 
Supreme Court Appointments 
Christine Kexel Chabot* 
This Article offers the first empirical analysis of the Senate’s role in constraining 
presidents’ choices of Supreme Court nominees over an extended historical period. It 
considers ideologies of Senates faced by nominating presidents and measures whether the 
ideologies of these Senates predict Justices’ voting behavior. The analysis substantially 
qualifies earlier understandings of senatorial constraint. 
 
Earlier empirical studies consider only limited numbers of recent nominees. They suggest 
that the Senate has constrained presidents’ choices, and many scholars theorize that the 
Senate has enhanced its role in the appointments process since the 1950s. Analysis of a 
larger group of nominees shows that the Senate’s ideology has had significant predictive 
power over Justices’ votes in only two isolated historical periods. Senatorial ideology was 
last significant in the 1970s, shortly after the filibuster of Abe Fortas’s nomination to be 
Chief Justice, but then it lost significance following rejection of Robert Bork’s nomination 
in 1987. 
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Introduction 
Supreme Court Justices sometimes disappoint their appointing 
presidents, and opposing-party Senates are often blamed for presidents’ 
“mistakes.”1 This Article offers the first empirical analysis of the Senate’s 
 
 1. Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Understanding the Constitutional Revolution, 87 Va. L. 
Rev. 1045, 1069–70 (2001) (blaming the Senate for Eisenhower’s “mistake” in appointing Justice 
Brennan and noting that Justices “tend to reflect the vector sum of political forces at the time of their 
confirmation”); Lori A. Ringhand, In Defense of Ideology: A Principled Approach to the Supreme 
Court Confirmation Process, 18 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 131, 157–58 (2009) (“Many of the examples 
of ‘disappointed’ presidents . . . can be traced directly to a president’s need to compromise with an 
ideologically hostile Senate.”). 
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role in constraining presidents’ choices of Supreme Court nominees over 
an extended historical period. It considers ideologies of Senates faced by 
nominating presidents and measures whether these ideologies predict 
Justices’ voting behavior. 
The Constitution authorizes the Senate to provide “Advice and 
Consent”2 on presidential nominees but does not resolve controversy over 
the Senate’s proper role.3 There are many open questions about the 
Senate’s ability to constrain presidential nominees.4 Beyond rejecting a 
minority of nominees, has the Senate generally forced presidents to 
nominate Justices who reflect the Senate’s ideology? Or has the Senate by 
and large deferred to presidential choices?5 And has the Senate always 
played a significant role, or has it aggrandized its position only after recent 
events, such as Robert Bork’s failed confirmation?6 
To illustrate how the Senate may constrain presidents’ choices, 
contrast the recent experiences of President George W. Bush with those of 
Presidents George H. W. Bush and Gerald Ford. Both of the second Bush 
administration’s appointees, Justices John Roberts and Samuel Alito, were 
nominated when Republicans enjoyed a strong majority in the Senate.7 
Roberts and Alito vote with one another at a relatively high rate, and they 
are generally thought to align with their nominating president’s policy 
preferences.8 Roberts and Alito also vote with appointees of other 
 
 2. U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
 3. Michael J. Gerhardt, The Federal Appointments Process: A Constitutional and 
Historical Analysis 135 (2000) (“[T]he Senate’s formal authority in the appointments process has 
never been as clear as that of the president.”). 
 4. The Senate’s constraint on the president’s choice of nominee may be described as part of the 
“silent operation” of the confirmation process. Lee Epstein & Jeffrey A. Segal, Advice and 
Consent: The Politics of Judicial Appointments 21 (2005) (citing The Federalist No. 76, at 456 
(Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)). 
 5. See Tonja Jacobi, The Impact of Positive Political Theory on Old Questions of Constitutional 
Law and the Separation of Powers, 100 Nw. U. L. Rev. 259, 276 (2006) (raising the question); Geoffrey 
R. Stone, Understanding Supreme Court Confirmations, 2010 Sup. Ct. Rev. 381, 396 n.32 (postulating 
that Senators confirm most Justices because they “usually defer to the president in terms of judicial 
philosophy,” or because “presidents generally are careful to choose nominees whom the Senate is 
likely to confirm”). Stone notes that it is difficult to measure the Senate’s influence on the president’s 
choice if the issue is cast purely in terms of nominees that the president did not select. Id. Here, I 
measure whether the president has been forced to select nominees who reflect the Senate’s ideology. 
 6. See Sarah A. Binder & Forrest Maltzman, Advice & Dissent: The Struggle to Shape the 
Federal Judiciary 7–10 (2009) (summarizing two competing theories of the appointments process, 
“big bang” versus “nothing-new-under-the-sun”); Benjamin Wittes, Confirmation Wars: Preserving 
Independent Courts in Angry Times 15–36 (2006). 
 7. Party Division in the Senate, 1789–Present, U.S. Senate, http://www.senate.gov/pagelayout/ 
history/one_item_and_teasers/partydiv.htm (last visited Feb. 25, 2013) (listing numbers of Senate seats 
controlled by each party for all Congresses); Supreme Court Nominations, Present–1789, U.S. Senate, 
http://www.senate.gov/pagelayout/reference/nominations/Nominations.htm (last visited Feb. 25, 2013) 
(providing dates of nominations). 
 8. Christine Kexel Chabot & Benjamin Remy Chabot, Mavericks, Moderates, or Drifters? 
Supreme Court Voting Alignments, 1838–2009, 76 Mo. L. Rev. 999, 1017 tbl.1 (2011). Roberts’ 
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Republican presidents much more often than they vote with Democratic 
appointees.9 
The George H.W. Bush and Ford administrations fared worse when 
nominating Justices to liberal, opposing-party Senates. Bush chose David 
Souter as a “safe” nominee in terms of his ability to win confirmation,10 but 
Souter turned out to be much more liberal than Bush.11 Souter voted with 
Bush’s other appointee, Clarence Thomas, in a relatively low percentage 
of cases.12 And while Thomas votes with Republican appointees at a high 
rate, Souter voted with Democratic appointees at an even higher rate.13 
Ford obtained a similar result when he nominated a known “moderate,” 
John Paul Stevens, to an “overwhelmingly Democratic Senate.”14 Once on 
the bench, Justice Stevens voted with Democratic appointees much more 
than he voted with fellow Republican appointees.15 
Souter’s and Stevens’ voting records suggest that the Senate may 
constrain presidents’ ability to nominate ideologically compatible 
Justices.16 Their voting patterns reflect the ideologies of Senates faced by 
nominating presidents rather than the ideologies of nominating presidents 
themselves. Is there any reason to think these examples are part of a larger 
pattern of senatorial constraint? If so, one would expect to see evidence in 
voting records for a larger set of Justices. 
To date, there have been a handful of empirical studies addressing the 
Senate’s role in shaping presidents’ choices of Supreme Court nominees. 
Byron Moraski and Charles Shipan’s leading study considers twenty-eight 
persons nominated to the Supreme Court from 1949 to 1994.17 They find 
 
surprising vote in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius may be explained as a 
departure from his generally conservative voting record. 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012). Or it may reflect the 
fact that the Republican party and President Bush’s outlooks on health care policy in 2005, when 
Roberts was appointed, diverge from the Republican party’s current take on this issue. See Mark 
Tushnet, Being “Good” at Picking Judges, Balkanization (July 7, 2012), http://balkin.blogspot.com/ 
2012/07/being-good-at-picking-judges.html. 
 9. Chabot & Chabot, supra note 8, at 1019 tbl.2. 
 10. George Watson & John A. Stookey, Shaping America: The Politics of Supreme Court 
Appointments 63 (1995). 
 11. “[T]he first president Bush’s selection of Justice Souter highlight[s] the risk that agents can 
deviate from the policy preferences of their principals.” Harold J. Krent, Presidential Powers 25 
(2005); see Christopher L. Eisgruber, The Next Justice: Repairing the Supreme Court 
Appointments Process 133 (2007). 
 12. Chabot & Chabot, supra note 8, at 1017 tbl.1. 
 13. Id. at 1019 tbl.2. 
 14. Epstein & Segal, supra note 4, at 21; David Alistair Yalof, Pursuit of Justices: 
Presidential Politics and the Selection of Supreme Court Nominees 175 (1999) (noting that Ford 
“settled” on Stevens, a “moderate noncontroversial jurist of unquestioned credentials”). 
 15. Chabot & Chabot, supra note 8, at 1019 tbl. 2. 
 16. See Ringhand, supra note 1, at 157–58 (arguing that Bush’s nomination of Souter “can be 
traced directly” to his “need to compromise with an ideologically hostile Senate”). 
 17. Bryon J. Moraski & Charles R. Shipan, The Politics of Supreme Court Nominations: A Theory 
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that presidents nominate ideologically compatible Justices when they are 
unconstrained by the Senate.18 Constrained presidents, however, nominate 
Justices closer to the Senate’s ideology than the president would otherwise 
prefer.19 Christine Nemacheck reaches a similar conclusion by comparing 
characteristics of thirty-nine actual nominees to those of 240 potential 
nominees from 1930 to 2005.20 She finds that presidents choose less 
ideologically proximate candidates when they face an opposing-party 
Senate.21 
These studies suggest that the Senate constrains presidents’ choices, 
but limited data forced the authors to consider only small numbers of 
nominees from relatively recent time periods. They also evaluate outcomes 
based on candidates’ perceived ideology at the time of nomination, rather 
than what they do once they are on the bench.22 
Analysis based on voting records for a larger sample of Justices calls 
the Senate’s ability to constrain presidents’ choices of nominees into 
doubt. My recent historical study, Mavericks, Moderates, or Drifters, 
considers voting records for eighty-nine Justices over a 172-year period.23 
It finds that just under half of these Justices voted with appointees of the 
other party most of the time.24 Senatorial constraint does not explain 
these independent voting patterns: Presidents did not appoint a greater 
percentage of ideologically incompatible Justices when they faced an 
opposing-party Senate.25 
This historical analysis raises significant questions about the Senate’s 
actual role. It relies only on count data, partisan measures of presidential 
and senatorial ideology, and a single cumulative voting record for each 
Justice.26 These are all rough metrics. They may miss underlying 
relationships or senatorial influence occurring only in a limited, recent 
time period. 
What is needed, then, is the more precise empirical analysis offered 
by this Article. It improves on earlier studies of recent nominees by 
considering actual voting behavior of seventy Justices appointed since 
 
of Institutional Constraints and Choices, 43 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 1069 (1999). 
 18. Id. at 1077 fig.3. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Christine L. Nemacheck, Strategic Selection: Presidential Nomination of Supreme Court 
Justices from Herbert Hoover Through George W. Bush 119 (2007). 
 21. Id. at 129. 
 22. Lee Epstein and Carol Mershon point out that the leading measure of perceived ideology 
used in Moraski and Shipan’s study, the Segal-Cover score, does not account for Justices’ votes in 
cases other than civil liberties or votes cast “over the course of an individual’s career.” Lee Epstein & 
Carol Mershon, Measuring Political Preferences, 40 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 261, 282, 284 (1996). 
 23. Chabot & Chabot, supra note 8, at 1019 tbl.2. 
 24. Id. at 1011 fig.2. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. 
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1862. Furthermore, my regression analysis builds on earlier historical work 
by evaluating relationships among fine-grained measures of voting 
behavior and presidential and senatorial ideology. 
The measure of voting behavior used in this study is paired agreement 
rates.27 These rates account for every agreement or disagreement between 
virtually every pair of Justices who sat together in 7520 non-unanimous 
cases decided over a 147-year period.28 This study also uses leading 
measures of presidential and senatorial ideology reported in Lee Epstein 
et al.’s U.S. Supreme Court Justices Database.29 Political scientist Keith 
Poole and his co-authors developed these measures, which are known as 
DW-NOMINATE Scores.30 They account for varied “ideological 
intensity” among presidents or Senators of the same party31 and have been 
found to “outperform” the party of an appointing president as a predictor 
of judicial behavior.32 
My analysis facilitates more careful understanding of the relationship 
between Justices’ voting behavior and the Senates that confirm them. It is 
also uniquely well situated to identify the Senate’s role in distinct 
historical and contemporary periods. 
Part I describes earlier scholarship evaluating the Senate’s 
constraint and theorizes about how the Senate’s role may have changed 
over time. Part II provides empirical analysis of the relationships among 
the Justices’ agreement rates, the ideologies of the Justices’ nominating 
presidents, and the Senates faced by these presidents. 
 
 27. These rates reflect the percentage of times two Justices agreed in a majority or minority vote 
on the judgment of non-unanimous cases. Justice Alito, for example, agreed with Justice Roberts 87% 
of the time, while he agreed with Justice Stevens only 44% of the time. Measuring Justices’ behavior 
based on paired agreement rates is a time-honored metric. Joshua B. Fischman & David S. Law, What 
Is Judicial Ideology, and How Should We Measure It?, 29 Wash. U. J.L. & Pol’y 133, 163 (2009) 
(discussing paired agreement rates used in C. Herman Pritchett, Divisions of Opinion Among Justices 
of the U.S. Supreme Court, 1939–1941, 35 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 890 (1941)). Paired agreement rates also 
reflect the same information contained in another leading measure of judicial ideology, Martin-Quinn 
scores. See Chabot & Chabot, supra note 8, at 1011 fig.2 (comparing rates of agreement to Martin-
Quinn scores, as described in Andrew D. Martin & Kevin M. Quinn, Dynamic Ideal Point Estimation 
via Markov Chain Monte Carlo for the U.S. Supreme Court, 1953–1999, 10 Pol. Analysis 134 (2002)). 
 28. For a description of the data sets supporting this study, see infra Part II.A and Chabot & 
Chabot, supra note 8, at 1006–08. 
 29. See Lee Epstein, Thomas G. Walker, Nancy Staudt, Scott Hendrickson & Jason Roberts, The 
U.S. Supreme Court Justices Database, Univ. S. Cal. (2010) [hereinafter Justices Database], available at 
http://epstein.usc.edu/research/justicesdata.html (documentation; variables 209 & 213). 
 30. See Royce Carroll et al., “Common-Space” DW-NOMINATE Scores with Bootstrapped 
Standard Errors, Voteview, http://voteview.com/dwnomin_joint_house_and_senate.htm (last visited 
Feb. 25, 2013). See generally Keith T. Poole & Howard Rosenthal, Congress: A Political 
Economic History of Roll Call Voting (1997). 
 31. Fischman & Law, supra note 27, at 174. 
 32. Lee Epstein et al., The Judicial Common Space, 23 J.L. Econ. & Org. 303, 306 (2007) 
(describing Giles’s study). 
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Taken as a whole, the data show that presidential ideology has had 
statistically significant predictive power over agreement rates, while 
senatorial ideology has not. The Senate’s ideology has had significant 
predictive power in only two isolated historical periods. The Senate’s 
ideology last gained significance around the 1970s, but it failed to 
maintain significant predictive power after the Senate rejected Robert 
Bork in 1987. 
I.  The Senate’s Role in Shaping Presidents’ Choices of Nominees 
There is no shortage of commentary as to what the Senate’s role 
should be.33 Studies analyzing what the Senate’s role has been have largely 
focused on confirmation votes34 or nominees it rejected.35 Presidents’ 
Supreme Court nominees are far more likely to be rejected when they face 
an opposing-party Senate.36 When placed in historical context, the Senate’s 
rejections of Supreme Court nominees in the 1960s, ‘70s, and ‘80s stand 
out only because they follow lengthy periods of unified government.37 
Analysis of rejections addresses only a minority of nominees.38 It 
fails to account for the “silent operation” of the confirmation process,39 
or the Senate’s constraint on a president’s choice of nominee. This leaves 
open two important questions with respect to the Senate’s influence over 
presidents’ choices of Justices: First, has the Senate generally constrained 
presidents’ choices? Second, has the Senate’s role changed over time? The 
following Subparts outline earlier scholarship addressing these questions 
and offer a framework for empirical analysis of the Senate’s role. 
A. Has the Senate Generally Constrained Presidents’ Choices? 
If presidents’ nominations are more likely to fail under divided 
government, it may also be that opposing-party Senates constrain 
presidents’ choices of nominees. Presidents facing an ideologically 
distant Senate may secure confirmation by nominating Justices closer to 
 
 33. See, e.g., Stephen L. Carter, The Confirmation Mess: Cleaning up the Federal 
Appointments Process (1994); Richard Davis, Electing Justice: Fixing the Supreme Court 
Nomination Process (2005); Eisgruber, supra note 11; John O. McGinnis, The President, the Senate, 
the Constitution, and the Confirmation Process: A Reply to Professors Strauss and Sunstein, 71 Tex. L. 
Rev. 633, 653 (1993); Stone, supra note 5, at 646–66; David A. Strauss & Cass R. Sunstein, The Senate, 
the Constitution, and the Confirmation Process, 101 Yale L.J. 1491, 1493–94 (1992). 
 34. Moraski & Shipan, supra note 17, at 1070 (summarizing studies of confirmation votes). 
 35. See Stone, supra note 5, at 382–83; Keith E. Whittington, Presidents, Senates, and Failed 
Supreme Court Nominations, 2006 Sup. Ct. Rev. 401, 412 (2006). 
 36. Stone, supra note 5, at 383 (“[T]he likelihood that a nomination will fail is much greater when 
the president faces a Senate controlled by the opposition party.”). 
 37. Id. at 383. 
 38. Supreme Court Nominations, supra note 7.  
 39. See supra note 4. 
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the Senate’s ideology than the president would otherwise prefer. Past 
studies suggest that the Senate constrains presidents’ choices in these 
circumstances. 
Moraski’s and Shipan’s leading study observes that presidents are 
better able to appoint ideologically compatible Justices when they are 
unconstrained by the Senate.40 Moraski and Shipan model a president’s 
choice of nominee as part of a “nomination game” in which presidents 
take “into account” the Senate’s “preferences.”41 The game begins when 
a vacancy occurs on the Court. The president’s nomination is the second 
stage of the game, and the Senate’s confirmation decision is the final 
stage of the game.42 
Moraski and Shipan assume that the president wants to nominate a 
Justice who will “move the median of the Court as close as possible” to 
the president’s own ideology.43 However, because presidents have a 
“strong incentive” to nominate someone who will be confirmed by the 
Senate, presidents select only the nominee who will “produce the best 
new median and who will also be approved by the Senate.”44 
They posit that presidents are unconstrained when the president and 
Senate fall on the same side as the Court’s median and the president is 
closest to the Court’s median.45 Moraski and Shipan expect unconstrained 
presidents to nominate Justices who share their own ideology.46 Presidents 
are semi-constrained when the Senate is closer to the Court’s median than 
the president, and they are fully constrained when the Senate and 
president are on opposite sides of the Court’s median.47 In both of these 
cases, Moraski and Shipan’s study hypothesizes that presidents will be 
forced to nominate Justices closer to the Senate’s ideal point than they 
would otherwise prefer.48 
Moraski and Shipan test whether these different levels of senatorial 
constraint predict ideology in a group of twenty-eight persons nominated 
to the Court from 1949 to 1994.49 They measure nominees’ ideology using 
Segal-Cover scores,50 which are leading ideological measures based on 
content analysis of “newspaper editorials written between the time of 
 
 40. Moraski & Shipan, supra note 17, at 1077 fig.2. 
 41. Id. at 1071. 
 42. They model a single period rather than a repeated game. Id. at 1071–72. 
 43. Id. at 1073. 
 44. Id. at 1074. 
 45. Id. at 1075. 
 46. Id. at 1075–76. 
 47. Id. at 1076–77. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. at 1078. 
 50. Id. at 1074. 
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[J]ustices’ nomination to the Court and their confirmation.”51 Thus the 
appointment’s outcome, or the liberal or conservative nature of the 
president’s choice of nominee, is reflected by Segal-Cover scores. The 
study evaluates whether the appointments outcomes reflected by these 
scores are better explained by the president’s or the Senate’s ideology.52 
Eighteen of the nominations in the study were made by unconstrained 
presidents.53 Three (Stevens, Bork, and Kennedy) were made by semi-
constrained presidents, and seven (Clark, Minton, Harlan, Souter, Thomas, 
and both Fortas nominations) were made by fully constrained presidents.54 
Moraski and Shipan find that the ideology of unconstrained presidents 
significantly predicts the nominees’ ideology.55 This relationship vanishes 
for nominees where the president is semi- or fully constrained.56 And when 
the president is fully constrained and disagrees with the Senate 
“completely about the ideological direction the Court should take,”57 the 
president accommodates the Senate.58 That is, fully constrained presidents 
nominate Justices closer to the Senate’s ideal point (and the Court’s 
median) than they would otherwise prefer.59 
 
 51. Epstein & Mershon, supra note 22, at 264. 
 52. Moraski & Shipan, supra note 17, at 1078–79. They primarily use earlier political science 
measures known as ADA scores as proxies for senatorial and presidential ideology. Id. at 1079. 
Because the Senate is a multi-member body, the study measures its ideology using an ideology score 
for the median member of the Senate. Id. at 1079. If all Senators are ranked from most liberal to most 
conservative, the “median is the case in the middle of the distribution . . . such that . . . half the 
senators are to the ideological right of the median and half are to the ideological left.” See Lee Epstein 
et al., Codebook: U.S. Supreme Court Justices Database 97 (2010) [hereinafter Codebook]. 
 53. Moraski & Shipan, supra note 17, at 1082 tbl.2.  
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. at 1081–84, 1083 tbl.3. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. at 1076, 1077 fig.3. Moraski and Shipan do not find that the Senate’s indifference point 
significantly predicts nominees’ ideology when the president is semi-constrained. Id. This result is not 
surprising given that only three nominees fall into this category. 
 58. Id. at 1083–84, 1083 tbl.3. 
 59. Id. Another study considering twenty-eight nominees suggests that the Senate may not 
constrain presidents if senatorial ideology is measured according to the filibuster pivot rather than the 
median member of the Senate. Timothy R. Johnson & Jason M. Roberts, Pivotal Politics, Presidential 
Capital, and Supreme Court Nominations, 32 Congress & Presidency 31 (2005). I ran a separate 
regression to account for the possibility that filibusters may lead presidents to select Justices closer to 
the filibuster pivot (currently the sixtieth most liberal or conservative Senator) than to the median 
Senator. As reported in Appendix A infra p. 1270 fig.6, this alternative measure also fails to identify 
significant predictive power over Justices’ votes. Other studies have found ideologies of home-state 
Senators to predict voting behavior of district and appellate court judges, due to the practice of 
senatorial courtesy. See, e.g., Fischman & Law, supra note 27, at 173–74 n.22 (discussing studies); 
Micheal W. Giles et al., Picking Federal Judges: A Note on Policy and Partisan Selection Agendas, 
54 Pol. Res. Q. 623, 635–37 (2001). Senatorial courtesy is not understood to play as significant a role 
across all Supreme Court appointments. See Epstein & Segal, supra note 4, at 22–23 (noting that, unlike 
Senators from states where there is a district court or court of appeals vacancy, “senators do not expect to 
have much of a say in the . . . nomination” of Supreme Court Justices); Giles et al., supra, at 628. 
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Likewise, Nemacheck analyzed whether presidents choose less 
ideologically proximate candidates when facing an opposing-party Senate. 
Her study considered presidents’ choices of thirty-nine Justices out of a 
group of 240 potential nominees from 1930 to 2005.60 Nemacheck 
measured the ideology of appointing presidents based on rankings 
developed by Poole et al.61 To craft a comparable measure of ideology 
for her pool of potential nominees, Nemacheck turned to measures 
reflecting the ideology of elite members of the candidate’s political party 
from the candidate’s home state.62 
Looking to these proxies for ideologies of all potential nominees, 
Nemacheck found that presidents preferred “ideologically proximate 
candidates” when selecting actual nominees.63 When presidents faced an 
opposing-party Senate, however, “ideological proximity [did] not have a 
significant effect” on presidents’ choice of nominees.64 
These studies find that the Senate constrains presidents’ choices, but 
they are based on the perceived ideologies of small numbers of appointees. 
Perceived ideologies are fixed at the time of appointment and thus do not 
reflect Justices’ actual behavior in subsequent years on the bench.65 The 
Segal-Cover scores used by Morsaki and Shipan may also fail to reflect 
Justices’ votes involving issues other than civil liberties.66 And analysis 
based on small samples of individual Justices may not offer an accurate 
estimate of the Senate’s role, even during the time periods covered. 
My 2011 study, Mavericks, Moderates, or Drifters, calls the Senate’s 
constraint into doubt.67 Historical voting records for eighty-nine Justices 
over a 172-year period show that just under half of these Justices voted 
with appointees of the other party most of the time.68 Senatorial 
constraint does not explain their independent voting patterns. Presidents 
 
 60. Nemacheck, supra note 20, at 119, 126 tbl.6.3. 
 61. Id. at 119–20.  
 62. Nemacheck assumed a same-party member of a state’s Congressional delegation represented 
the views of that party’s political elites, and thus Supreme Court candidates, within a given state. 
Nemacheck, supra note 20, at 120. Poole’s ideological scores rank all members of Congress from 
liberal to conservative on a scale of -1 to +1. Id. Nemacheck used this ranking to identify the score for 
the median member of the group of “same party members of Congress from the candidate’s state.” Id. 
at 120. If a candidate had served in Congress and had his or her own DW-NOMINATE score, 
Nemacheck used that score instead. Id. 
 63. Id. at 129. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Epstein & Mershon, supra note 22, at 282. 
 66. Id. at 284. 
 67. Chabot & Chabot, supra note 8, at 1019 tbl.2. 
 68. Id. 
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appoint about the same percentage of ideologically incompatible Justices 
no matter which party controls the Senate.69 
This finding, however, does not definitively foreclose results of 
studies based on contemporary appointments. Perhaps the Senate plays a 
significant role, but only recently and in the limited time periods covered 
by other studies. The Justice-level, cumulative voting records used in 
Mavericks, Moderates, or Drifters offer only limited ability to identify 
changes in the Senate’s role over time.70 For example, recent divided 
government appointments such as Justices Anthony Kennedy and David 
Souter may give some reason to think the Senate has enhanced its role 
post-Bork. Kennedy sided moderately with Justices appointed by the same 
party; Souter sided strongly with Justices appointed by the other party.71 
But it is difficult to tell whether things have changed based only on 
cumulative voting records for eight Justices appointed since that time.72 
This study builds on earlier historical work by addressing both the 
Senate’s general influence over appointments and measuring how its role 
may have changed over time. 
B. Has the Senate’s Role Changed over Time? 
Past empirical studies do not adequately address the Senate’s 
historical role. They lack either historical data or analysis designed to 
pinpoint the Senate’s influence in discrete historical time periods. Thus, 
they fail to account for the Senate’s role following early twentieth-century 
events such as the passage of the Seventeenth Amendment,73 the 
controversial confirmation hearings of Louis Brandeis,74 and the Senate’s 
frequent rejection of nominees in the nineteenth century.75 And without an 
adequate understanding of the Senate’s historical role, these studies fail to 
 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id.  
 71. Id.; see Ringhand, supra note 1, at 158 (asserting that the first President Bush and President 
Reagan “needed to take senatorial preferences into account” when selecting Souter and Kennedy). 
 72. Chabot & Chabot, supra note 8, at 1020–21 (noting that a “small sample” of Justices limits the 
ability to assess change in recent time periods). The study considered appointments through Justice 
Sonia Sotomayor. Id. at 1017 tbl.1. Of course, voting records may not reflect some instances where the 
Senate compelled presidents to moderate their choices to a lesser degree. President Bill Clinton, for 
example, wanted to nominate Justices more liberal than Steven Breyer or Ruth Bader Ginsburg. 
Davis, supra note 33, at 158; see Mark Silverstein, Judicious Choices: The New Politics of Supreme 
Court Confirmations 170–71 (1994) (stating that Ginsburg was not the “homerun” nominee Clinton 
had hoped for). Clinton moderated his choices to avoid a confirmation battle with the Senate. Once on 
the bench, however, Ginsburg and Breyer sided with other Democratic nominees. See Chabot & 
Chabot, supra note 8, at 1019 tbl.2. Thus, despite his moderation, Clinton basically got what he wanted 
from his appointees. See Epstein & Segal, supra note 4, at 132. 
 73. U.S. Const. amend. XVII. 
 74. Epstein & Segal, supra note 4, at 1–2. 
 75. Whittington, supra note 35, at 413–14;  Supreme Court Nominations, supra note 7. 
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provide a baseline from which to evaluate the modern appointments 
process. 
Still, scholars offer competing theories as to whether and when the 
Senate’s role changed. Some scholars contend that there has been no 
“wholesale change” in an appointments process that “is and always has 
been political.”76 The Senate has a long history of contesting presidents’ 
Supreme Court nominees. It frequently rejected nominees in the 
nineteenth century.77 Keith Whittington describes the postbellum period as 
one characterized by “political infighting,” “patronage politics,” and 
“pitched battles” between presidents and Senators attempting to “control 
the appointment power.”78 
Although the Senate stopped rejecting nominees as frequently by the 
beginning of the twentieth century, it may still have played a significant 
role. Lee Epstein and Jeffrey Segal point to the raging “confirmation 
battle” over Woodrow Wilson’s 1916 nomination of Louis Brandeis as 
evidence of historical conflict.79 Henry Abraham states that the 
“confirmation battle still ranks as the most bitter and most intensely fought 
in the history of the Court.”80 Thus “political clashes over candidates for 
the Supreme Court” are anything but a “new phenomenon.”81 
Segal and Epstein also explain that factors associated with 
aggressive confirmation hearings today—media attention and interest 
group involvement—have also been present throughout history. 
Brandeis, for example, was “the target of press attacks from the Wall 
Street Journal and the New York Times, among others, which deemed him 
a dangerous ‘radical.’”82 And in 1930, “labor and civil rights groups sent 
telegram after telegram to Senators urging them to vote against” nominee 
John Parker.83 Parker, who was nominated by Herbert Hoover, stands 
out as the only Supreme Court nominee to be rejected by the Senate in 
the first half of the twentieth century.84 
Other scholars posit enhanced politicization of the appointments 
process and a pronounced shift in the Senate’s role at some point in the 
latter part of the twentieth century. They offer competing theories as to 
 
 76. Epstein & Segal, supra note 4, at 4.  
 77. Whittington, supra note 35, at 413–14;  Supreme Court Nominations, supra note 7. 
 78. Whittington, supra note 35, at 430. 
 79. Epstein & Segal, supra note 4, at 1–2.  
 80. Henry J. Abraham, Justices, Presidents, and Senators: A History of the U.S. Supreme 
Court Appointments from Washington to Bush II 135 (rev’d ed. 1999). 
 81. Epstein & Segal, supra note 4, at 1–2. 
 82. Id. at 93. 
 83. Id. at 94–95. 
 84. Supreme Court Nominations, supra note 7. 
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the precise date of change. The following Subparts discuss these theories 
and outline possible, concurrent changes in appointing presidents’ roles. 
1. Routine Questioning Starting in the 1950s 
Benjamin Wittes asserts that “the critical shift in the confirmation 
process began with Brown [v. Board of Education]85 and established a new 
status quo as the Court’s aggressiveness increased over the subsequent two 
decades.”86 Thus, “the first major watershed” occurred far in advance of 
the Bork nomination. It occurred in response to President Dwight 
Eisenhower’s nomination of John Marshall Harlan shortly after Brown.87 
The Senate’s questioning of Harlan signaled the start of its “current 
practice” of requiring nominees to testify before the Judiciary Committee 
“as a matter of course.”88 And unlike in the past, the Senate now used 
these proceedings to “grill the nominees about individual cases or about 
their judicial philosophies.”89 
Whether this immediately enhanced the Senate’s influence over 
presidents’ choices of nominees is less clear. Wittes notes that the shift 
marked by the Harlan confirmation proceedings “took place gradually.”90 
Senators in subsequent hearings “did not immediately push every 
nominee to bare his soul.”91 Moreover, both nominees and the press 
pushed back against the Senate’s initial attempts to raise questions about 
nominees’ substantive views.92 Finally, while Wittes speculates this shift 
may have ultimately led presidents “to satisfy the opposing party” in 
their choices of nominees, he does not provide any examples of 
presidents doing so immediately after Harlan’s confirmation.93 
2. Enhanced Political Pressure and the Filibuster in the Late 1960s 
Other scholars assert that the Senate’s role changed at later dates. 
Mark Silverstein posits that a “New Political Calculus” for confirmations 
emerged in the late 1960s.94 By this time, “politically powerful groups” 
were “willing to invest substantial time and resources in the battle to 
 
 85. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 86. Wittes, supra note 6, at 60. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Stone, supra note 5, at 427; see Gerhardt, supra note 3, at 68; Wittes, supra note 6, at 61. 
 89. Wittes, supra note 6, at 61. 
 90. Id. at 69–70. 
 91. Id. at 69. 
 92. Id. at 67–69, 91 (describing evasive responses given by Harlan and William Brennan, as well 
as editorial criticisms of Senate’s questioning appearing in the New York Times and the Washington Post). 
 93. Id. at 92. 
 94. Silverstein, supra note 72, at 154.  
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control the judiciary.”95 Formal interest group participation in 
confirmation hearings became a staple after the Fortas filibuster in 1968.96 
In addition, the “erosion of the old Senate norms” increased 
incentives for individual Senators to play a more active role in 
confirmation decisions.97 Senators now operated under new norms where it 
was no longer safe to “simply conform to the expectations of peers and 
accept the president’s choice.”98 Instead, every Senator now faced 
significant electoral consequences in voting “for or against a particular 
nominee.”99 
The Senate may have assumed a greater role in appointments in the 
wake of these enhanced political pressures. Richard Davis states that 
calls “for Senate assertiveness in the nomination process began with 
Republican Senators during the unsuccessful confirmation effort for Abe 
Fortas as chief justice in 1968.”100 
Silverstein contends that the Senate’s failure to confirm Fortas as 
Chief Justice in 1968 “signaled an important shift . . . in the process of 
appointing Supreme Court justices.”101Although Fortas was nominated at 
the end of Lyndon Johnson’s term as president, the nomination 
originally appeared to be a “sure thing.”102 Fortas had easily been 
confirmed by the Senate as an Associate Justice three years earlier.103 
However, “Johnson’s fabled mastery and control of the legislative 
process evaporated in an astonishing series of events.”104 
The Senate Judiciary Committee grilled Fortas about his role as 
adviser to the president, as well as the ideological direction of the Warren 
Court.105 Although the Judiciary Committee voted to report favorably on 
Fortas’ nomination, the nomination was filibustered when it reached the 
Senate floor.106 Fortas was the first nominee who failed to gain 
confirmation since John Parker in 1930 and only the second failed 
Supreme Court nominee in the twentieth century.107 The Fortas 
 
 95. Id. 
 96. Nemacheck, supra note 20, at 48 (citing Jeffrey A. Segal et al., A Spatial Model of Roll Call 
Voting: Senators, Constituents, Presidents, and Interest Groups in Supreme Court Confirmations, 
36 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 96 (1992)). 
 97. Silverstein, supra note 72, at 154. 
 98. Id.  
 99. Id. 
 100. Davis, supra note 33, at 20–21. 
 101. Silverstein, supra note 72, at 12. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. at 11–12. 
 104. Id. at 11. 
 105. Id. at 24–25. 
 106. Id. at 27. 
 107. Supreme Court Nominations, supra note 7. 
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nomination marked the first time the Senate used the filibuster to oppose a 
Supreme Court nominee.108 
The pattern of opposition continued after Richard Nixon took 
office. Although the Senate approved Richard Nixon’s nomination of 
Warren Burger as Chief Justice, it went on to reject Nixon’s nominations 
of Clement Haynsworth, Jr. and G. Harrold Carswell.109 
Silverstein contends that this politicized confirmation process 
changed modern presidents’ incentives with respect to Supreme Court 
nominations.110 It was no longer sufficient to choose Justices based on 
“excellence on the bench.”111 Instead, presidents would now be “compelled 
to seek out nominees” with characteristics that would minimize political 
opposition to their confirmation.112 
Silverstein focuses on how this political pressure appears to have 
shaped nomination decisions in the Reagan and first Bush 
administrations.113 But the changed confirmation environment also may 
have influenced earlier presidents. When nominating a Justice in the 
wake of the Haynsworth and Carswell rejections, for example, Nixon 
ended up choosing a “moderate conservative,” Harry Blackmun.114 And 
when Gerald Ford faced an “overwhelmingly Democratic Senate,” he 
chose a known “moderate,” John Paul Stevens.115 
3. Borking Bork in 1987 
For some observers, the critical shift in the Senate’s role was its 
politically charged rejection of Robert Bork, who was Ronald Reagan’s 
third nominee to the Supreme Court.116 Ideology clearly played a key role 
 
 108. Davis, supra note 33, at 79; Epstein & Segal, supra note 4, at 24. 
 109. Supreme Court Nominations, supra note 7. 
 110. Silverstein, supra note 72, at 100. 
 111. Id. Silverstein suggests that enhanced political pressure may also make it more difficult for 
presidents to nominate Justices of great professional stature. Id. at 160–62 (indicating that today’s 
more democratic process may make it more difficult to nominate Justices of “talent” and “distinction” 
similar to that of Thurgood Marshall, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Louis Brandeis, and Charles Evans 
Hughes). Other scholars suggest that enhanced political pressure may have the opposite effect: It may 
lead presidents to nominate Justices who have impeccable professional credentials. Stone, supra note 
5, at 410–14 (proposing that “highly qualified” nominees may have an easier time overcoming 
senatorial opposition). This study does not attempt to measure professional qualifications of 
presidents’ nominees. 
 112. Silverstein, supra note 72, at 100. 
 113. For example, he describes Sandra Day O’Connor, Anthony Kennedy, and David Souter as 
“stealth” candidates whose unknown political views helped them win confirmation. Id. at 164. He also 
describes Clarence Thomas as a nominee whose known conservatism was offset by the racial and 
socioeconomic diversity he would bring to the Court. Id. at 99. 
 114. Id. at 108–09. 
 115. Epstein & Segal, supra note 4, at 21; Yalof, supra note 14, at 175 (stating that Ford “settled” 
on Stevens, a “moderate noncontroversial jurist of unquestioned credentials”). 
 116. John Anthony Maltese, The Selling of Supreme Court Nominees 7 (1995) (explaining that 
 
Chabot_26 (C. Ashba) (Do Not Delete) 7/15/2013 6:03 PM 
1244 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 64:1229 
 
in rejecting Bork, a candidate whose professional and intellectual 
credentials were beyond reproach.117 Bork, in particular, predicted that 
the Senate’s action would force future presidents to nominate moderate 
candidates with short paper trails.118 John Maltese has described Bork’s 
defeat as the “watershed event that unleashed what Stephen Carter has 
called ‘the confirmation mess.’”119 Many portray the Bork confirmation 
process as “unprecedented . . . in terms of the breadth of involvement by 
organized interests, . . . the length and detail of Bork’s public testimony 
before the Senate Judiciary Committee, and the number of witnesses 
appearing at the televised hearings.”120 
Whether this actually enhanced the Senate’s influence over 
presidents’ choices is less clear. To be sure, much of the mess persists in the 
ongoing conflict over appointments to federal circuit and district courts.121 
With respect to the Supreme Court, it seems to have constrained Reagan 
and George H.W. Bush in their next two official nominations of Kennedy 
and Souter.122 But then Bush successfully nominated Clarence Thomas for 
confirmation by a liberal Senate.123 Since that time, presidents have 
appointed a string of ideologically compatible Justices, but they have not 
faced opposing-party Senates.124 
 
the Bork confirmation process was “unprecedented” in terms of interest group involvement and 
nature of hearings); Wittes, supra note 6, at 21 (noting one argument that the “watershed event” in 
changing the appointments process “was the fight over the Bork nomination in 1987” in which the 
Senate rejected Bork); Yalof, supra note 14, at 189 (“Bork’s ill-fated Supreme Court bid in 1987 
fundamentally changed the nature of public discourse that would surround all future Supreme Court 
appointments.”); see Binder & Maltzman, supra note 6, at 7–8 (raising the same argument). 
 117. Silverstein, supra note 72, at 122. 
 118. Robert H. Bork, The Tempting of America: The Political Seduction of the Law 347 
(1990) (“A president who wants to avoid a battle like mine . . . is likely to nominate men and women 
who have not written much, and certainly nothing that could be regarded as controversial . . . .”); see 
Stone, supra note 5, at 415. 
 119. See Binder & Maltzman, supra note 6, at 7–8 (quoting John Anthony Maltese, Anatomy of a 
Confirmation Mess: Recent Trends in the Federal Judicial Selection Process, JURIST Online 
Symposium (Univ. of Pittsburgh Sch. of Law, Apr. 15, 2004), http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/forum/ 
Symposium-jc/Maltese.php#2); see Wittes, supra note 6, at 21. 
 120. Maltese, supra note 116, at 7; Yalof, supra note 14, at 160 (“The Bork nomination became a 
watershed in terms of interest group involvement in the appointments process.”). 
 121. Sarah Binder and Forrest Maltzman describe an “acrimonious and dysfunctional” 
confirmation process resulting in “declining confirmation rates and unprecedented delay” for lower 
federal court judges. Binder & Maltzman, supra note 6, at 1; see id. at 3–6 figs.1-1 to 1-3 (providing 
recent statistics on declining confirmation rates and increasing delays in confirming lower court 
judges); Wittes, supra note 6, at 38–39 (same). 
 122. Ringhand, supra note 1, at 158. 
 123. Party Division in the Senate, supra note 7; Supreme Court Nominations, supra note 7. 
 124. Chabot & Chabot, supra note 8, at 1019 tbl.2.  
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Some scholars contend the Bork nomination was actually the 
Senate’s undoing. The problem may be that the Bork confirmation 
hearings were too successful. As described by Christopher Eisgruber: 
The Bork nomination changed the way that confirmation hearings 
proceed. Never again will a nominee with an extreme or controversial 
judicial philosophy answer questions as candidly as Bork did. In that 
sense, the Bork hearings . . . were a success that cannot be repeated.125 
Thus, the Senate’s success in rejecting Bork on ideological grounds gave 
future nominees tremendous incentives to avoid candid discussion of their 
ideological views. As described by then-professor Elena Kagan, the Bork 
hearings were a one-time event that has turned subsequent confirmation 
testimony into nothing more than a “vapid and hollow charade.”126 
If the Bork debacle undermined the Senate’s effective use of 
confirmation hearings, then presidents may not have felt as much pressure 
to take senatorial preferences into account. They could nominate an 
ideologically proximate candidate who could be coached to evade rigorous 
questioning and withhold revealing answers at a confirmation hearing. 
4. Change in the President’s Role? 
However, the Senate does not operate in a vacuum, and it is 
important to consider whether—in the role of appointing—the president 
has changed alongside the Senate. Although analysis of presidential 
nomination decisions is more rare, David Yalof’s careful study of the 
Supreme Court nomination process provides helpful background. 
Yalof focuses on a recent period: He “relates how presidents since 
World War II have selected nominees to serve on the United States 
Supreme Court.”127 During this time, presidents employed a very different 
set of selection strategies. For example, Harry Truman chose “close friends 
and loyalists,”128 and Dwight Eisenhower tried to set himself apart from 
Truman. Eisenhower adopted an “impersonal” method of selecting 
nominees.129 His selection criteria focused on identifying candidates with 
outstanding qualifications who shared his moderate political views.130 
But there is some reason to think that presidents also placed 
enhanced political emphasis on appointments by the 1970s. Yalof notes 
that in the 1970s and ‘80s, Nixon and Reagan pursued “ideological goals” 
 
 125. Eisgruber, supra note 11, at 156; Stone, supra note 5, at 435 (noting that “after the furor over 
Bork had passed, subsequent nominees reverted to the safety of the traditional approach” and were 
closed-mouthed about their views). 
 126. Elena Kagan, Confirmation Messes, Old and New, 62 U. Chi. L. Rev. 919, 941 (1995). 
 127. Yalof, supra note 14, at vii. 
 128. Id. at 21. 
 129. Id. at 41. 
 130. Id. at 42 (citing Letter from Dwight D. Eisenhower to Edgar N. Eisenhower (Oct. 1, 1953), in 
Ann C. Whitman Files). 
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in appointments “especially aggressively.”131 Nixon made the issue a 
central part of his presidential campaign in 1968.132 He promised to focus 
on ideology in making appointments. He blamed “the Warren Court for 
civil unrest” and “promised to appoint only conservative ‘law and order’ 
judges who would strictly interpret the Constitution.”133 While Gerald Ford 
was in too weak a position to continue this role (and Jimmy Carter did not 
have an opportunity to appoint a Justice), Reagan renewed efforts to 
appoint conservative Justices.134 
Still, Nixon’s and Reagan’s pursuit of ideological goals may not 
indicate a change in the executive role. They were by no means the first 
presidents to consider the ideology of nominees.135 Nor can one fall back 
on the fact that Nixon and Reagan enjoyed bureaucratic resources 
unavailable to many early presidents:136 It is unclear whether mere use of 
additional staff enhanced either Nixon’s or Reagan’s appointment 
power.137 
Changes in technology may have played a greater part in bolstering 
presidents’ roles. By the Reagan administration, “[a]dvances in research 
technology allowed the administration . . . to review the complete body of 
judicial opinions for every jurist under consideration.”138 Access to 
information in computerized databases such as LexisNexis and WestLaw 
“increased the amount of readily available information on candidates 
exponentially.”139 
Yalof recounts that “never before” the time of President Reagan had 
the selection process involved “such an excruciatingly detailed 
examination” of potential nominees’ past writings.140 And the research 
technology supporting this analysis remains available to subsequent 
 
 131. Eisgruber, supra note 11, at 126; Yalof, supra note 14, at 177 (noting that Nixon and Reagan 
employed “‘criteria-driven’ framework” for selecting Justices). 
 132. Yalof, supra note 14, at 97–98. 
 133. Id.; see Eisgruber, supra note 11, at 126. 
 134. Wittes, supra note 6, at 27 (noting Reagan’s pursuit of conservative judicial appointments). 
 135. History books are rife with contrary examples and describe “efforts to mold the Court” that 
“date from George Washington” and have “hardly abated with recent presidents.” Davis, supra note 
33, at 42. 
 136. FDR’s administration established the Office of Legal Counsel and expanded the White House 
staff. See Yalof, supra note 14, at 12–13. Earlier presidents, who had only a “weak attorney general 
and Spartan White House” staff, often “sorted through” candidates “on their own.” Id. at 10. 
 137. Id. at 186 (stating the “adage too many cooks spoiled the broth never proved more apt” than 
in the failure of “overlapping staff responsibilities” to select the best nominees for Presidents Reagan 
and Nixon). 
 138. Id. at 17, 166 (discussing advances in legal research technology available to all “modern 
participants in the appointments process”). 
 139. Nemacheck, supra note 20, at 20–21. 
 140. Yalof, supra note 14, at 144; see Nemacheck, supra note 20, at 86–87 (noting heightened 
research conducted by the Reagan administration). 
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administrations. The decision to choose nominees almost exclusively from 
a pool of candidates with prior judicial experience141 and a body of judicial 
opinions to review may have helped presidents exploit this technology to 
even greater advantage. 
Although presidents since Reagan placed varying levels of emphasis 
on the ideology of nominees,142 with the exception of Souter they 
generally succeeded in appointing ideologically compatible Justices.143 
This recent string of “successes” coincides with an enhanced ability to 
scour nominees’ past writings for evidence of their ideology. It may be 
that technology has enhanced presidents’ ability to appoint ideologically 
compatible Justices in recent years. 
C. Testable Theories 
As a whole, past studies leave unresolved many important questions 
about the Senate’s role. Studies based on small samples of contemporary 
Justices suggest that the Senate constrains presidents’ choices of 
Supreme Court nominees. But these studies fail to address whether the 
Senate’s constraint has persisted or evolved historically, and whether 
there is any association between the ideology of Senates to which 
Justices are nominated and how Justices vote. The historical voting data 
used in this study support analysis of these questions. 
II.  Empirical Analysis 
This Part measures the relationships among Justices’ voting behavior 
and ideologies of presidents and Senates at the time of nomination. 
Specifically, it evaluates whether my dependent variable, Justices’ rates of 
agreement, is predicted by senatorial ideology. It addresses both the 
general predictive power of the Senate’s ideology and how it may have 
changed over time. 
A. Data 
This study draws on 7520 non-unanimous cases from contemporary 
and historical data sets144 to support analysis of voting records for seventy 
individual Justices and 969 pairs of Justices from 1862 to 2009. 
 
 141. See generally Tracey E. George, From Judge to Justice: Social Background Theory and the 
Supreme Court, 86 N.C. L. Rev. 1333 (2007). 
 142. The first and second Bush administrations shared Reagan’s desire to appoint conservative 
Justices. See Wittes, supra note 6, at 27. Although Bill Clinton and Barack Obama may have placed less 
emphasis on ideology alone, they generally succeeded in appointing ideologically compatible Justices. 
 143. See Chabot & Chabot, supra note 8, at 1019 tbl.2. 
 144. I use 1924 non-unanimous cases from my historical data set, see Chabot & Chabot, supra note 
8, at 1006–08, and 5596 non-unanimous cases from Harold J. Spaeth’s contemporary data set in Sup. 
Ct. Database, http://scdb.wustl.edu/data.php (last visited Feb. 25, 2013) (using the Dataset’s 2010 
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B. Dependent Variable 
My dependent variable is Justices’ paired rates of agreement in non-
unanimous cases. This is a time-honored metric that reflects the same 
information contained in a leading measure of ideology known as 
Martin-Quinn scores.145 
This study calculates agreement rates in two steps. First, for each 
non-unanimous case, it records whether two Justices agreed in a majority 
or minority vote on a judgment. It counts votes for a majority, plurality, 
or concurrence as part of the majority coalition and votes for a dissent as 
part of a minority coalition. 
Second, this study adds each case in which the pair agreed and 
divides this number by the total number of cases in which the pair sat 
together. This calculation provides a rate of agreement for each pair of 
Justices who sat together. 
Paired agreement rates capture differences and similarities in voting 
behavior without noise that may be introduced by directional coding of 
case outcomes.146 For example, Justice Stevens agreed with Justice 
Ginsburg in 76% of non-unanimous cases, while he agreed with Justice 
Scalia in only 43% of non-unanimous cases. Note that it is not helpful to 
include unanimous cases because they offer no additional information 
about Justices’ relative positions. Stevens agrees with Scalia and Ginsburg 
at the same rate in unanimous cases. 
 
Release 02, which includes votes from 1953–2009). The historical data exclude a small percentage of 
individual Justices’ votes for opinions that the Supreme Court Historical Society coded as separate 
opinions or statements rather than majority, concurrence, or dissent. See Chabot & Chabot, supra note 
8, at 1042 n.142. My historical time period has a smaller number of non-unanimous cases because 
Justices wrote far fewer dissents and concurrences before 1925. See Lee Epstein et al., The Norm of 
Consensus on the U.S. Supreme Court, 45 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 362, 363 fig.1 (2001); Stephen C. Halpern & 
Kenneth N. Vines, Institutional Disunity, the Judges’ Bill and the Role of the U.S. Supreme Court, 
30 W. Pol. Q. 471, 476, 478–80 & figs.1–3 (1977). 
 145. This metric follows “some of the earliest empirical studies of the Supreme Court,” in which 
“political scientist Herman Pritchett constructed tables showing how often each pair of Justices was in 
agreement, or how often each pair dissented together.”  Fischman & Law, supra note 27, at 163 (citing 
C. Herman Pritchett, Divisions of Opinion Among Justices of the U.S. Supreme Court, 1939–1941, 
35 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 890 (1941)). For an illustration of how it reflects the same information contained 
in Martin-Quinn, see Chabot & Chabot, supra note 8, at 1011 fig.2 (discussing similarities between 
percentages of agreement and Martin-Quinn Scores for 2009). 
 146. Directional coding would identify whether a Justice voted in favor of a liberal or conservative 
outcome for each case. While in theory directional coding could capture the same differences or 
similarities in Justices’ votes, it is difficult to identify a single, objective conservative or liberal outcome for 
cases across all areas of the Court’s docket. See Fischman & Law, supra note 27, at 160–62; William M. 
Landes & Richard A. Posner, Rational Judicial Behavior: A Statistical Study, 1 J. Legal Analysis 775, 
778–79 (2009); Carolyn Shapiro, Coding Complexity: Bringing Law to the Empirical Analysis of the 
Supreme Court, 60 Hastings L.J. 477, 480, 493 (2009); Anna Harvey & Michael Woodruff, Confirmation 
Bias in the United States Supreme Court Judicial Database, 29 J.L. Econ. & Org. 414, 415 (2013). This 
study avoids judgments involved in directional coding by looking to Justices’ agreement rates alone. 
May 2013]   INFLUENCE OVER COURT APPOINTMENTS 1249 
 
Paired agreement rates also yield a large number of observations for 
regression analysis. This study uses rates of agreement for 969 pairs of 
Justices who sat together over a 147-year period. These data reflect 
voting behavior for seventy Justices, from Noah Swayne through Sonia 
Sotomayor, and all other Justices with whom they sat. It excludes a 
handful of Justices for whom no presidential ideology scores are 
available.147 Although the historical data set has voting records for Justices 
before Swayne, the analysis starts with Swayne because paired agreement 
rates for earlier appointees are based on smaller numbers of cases. 
C. Explanatory Variables 
This study considers whether two explanatory variables predict 
Justices’ rates of agreement. The variables are ideologies of presidents 
and ideologies of median members of the Senate at the time of 
nomination.148 It is important to consider both presidential and senatorial 
ideology when identifying the Senate’s role. For example, it may be that 
Justices’ voting patterns are completely unpredictable. Presidents may 
never appoint Justices whose votes can be explained by presidential or 
senatorial ideology. This would suggest that judicial independence plays 
a much greater role than senatorial constraint. 
If presidents have some power to predict how their appointees will 
vote, however, then the Senate may constrain the presidents’ choices. If it 
does, Justices’ voting behavior should reflect ideologies of Senates faced 
by nominating presidents. Of course, presidents and Senates will 
themselves be ideologically proximate in some cases. But this is not always 
the case, and regression analysis can identify whether Justices’ voting 
behavior varies according to changes in senatorial ideology. It can also 
identify whether presidents generally appoint Justices who reflect their 
own ideology regardless of the Senate. The Subpart below describes 
measures of presidential and senatorial ideology used to support this 
analysis. 
This Article quantifies presidential and senatorial ideology using 
leading political science metrics reported in the U.S. Supreme Court 
Justices Database.149 The scores it reports for nominating presidents and 
 
 147. I exclude Justices for whom no presidential DW-NOMINATE scores are available: Cardozo, 
Roberts, L.Q. Lamar, Fuller, Matthews, Woods, and Harlan. Also, I was concerned that certain pairs 
had unusually high rates of agreement based on limited opportunities to agree. To correct for this I 
eliminated two pairs of Justices that had a 100% agreement rate. 
 148. If all Senators are ranked from most liberal to most conservative, the “median is the case in 
the middle of the distribution . . . such that . . . half the senators are to the ideological right of the 
median and half are to the ideological left.” Codebook, supra note 52. 
 149. Justices Database, supra note 29 (variables 209 and 213). This database is prepared by Lee 
Epstein, Thomas G. Walker, Nancy Staudt, Scott A. Hendrickson, and Jason M. Roberts, and it 
documents background information for all official Supreme Court nominees. 
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median members of the Senate at time of nomination are known as first 
dimension, common space DW-NOMINATE scores, and they were 
developed by Poole et al.150 
Poole et al.’s DW-NOMINATE scores (or an earlier variant of these 
scores) have helped explain judicial behavior or identify judicial ideology 
in several prominent studies.151 As explained by Lee Epstein et al., Poole’s 
work in this area makes a “profound contribution . . . to the study of 
American political institutions.”152 The resulting metrics account for varied 
ideological intensity among presidents or Senators of the same party153 and 
have been found to outperform “other common measures, such as the 
party of the appointing President” as a predictor of judicial behavior.154 
The DW-NOMINATE scores rank Senators or presidents from 
liberal to conservative on a scale of -1 to +1.155 They are derived from roll 
call votes cast by each member of Congress and are comparable across 
different Congresses.156 The scores also rank presidents in equivalent 
terms, based on the positions they took on particular congressional roll call 
votes.157 The first dimension coordinate of the scores used here “typically 
picks up the liberal/conservative dimension of conflict in American 
politics.”158 For Justices who were elevated to Chief Justice while serving as 
Associate Justices, such as William Rehnquist, DW-NOMINATE scores 
are used for their initial nomination to the Court. 
Note that this study focuses on the ideological proximity between 
the two presidents who nominated a pair of Justices, as well as the 
proximity between median members of Senates faced by these 
nominating presidents. To measure ideological proximity, I calculate 
absolute distance between DW-NOMINATE scores for a particular pair 
of Justices’ nominating presidents or Senates. This provides a metric of 
how ideologically close or distant the pairs’ presidents or Senates may be. 
 
 150. Codebook, supra note 148, at 95, 97–98 (variables 209 and 213); see Carroll et al., supra note 30. 
 151. Epstein & Segal, supra note 4, at 131 fig.5.4 (finding Poole’s measure of appointing 
presidents’ ideology to generally predict the direction of Justices’ votes in recent time periods); 
Nemacheck, supra note 20, at 129 (using DW-NOMINATE score as a measure of nominating 
president’s ideology and finding that unconstrained presidents select ideologically proximate Justices); 
Giles et al., supra note 59, at 631 (using Poole and Rosenthal’s “first dimension common space scores 
to measure the ideological preferences of the appointing president and relevant senators” and finding 
that both presidential ideology and ideology of home state senator helped predict court of appeals 
judges’ votes); see Frank B. Cross, Decision Making in the U.S. Courts of Appeals 166, 172–75 
(2007) (using common space scores to identify median judges on panel of court of appeals judges). 
 152. Epstein et al., supra note 32, at 306 n.4. 
 153. Fischman & Law, supra note 27, at 174. 
 154. Epstein et al., supra note 32, at 306–07 (describing Giles’s study). 
 155. See Codebook, supra note 52, at 95, 97. 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. 
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For example, Stevens and Ginsburg were nominated by 
ideologically distant presidents. Ford, who nominated Stevens, has a 
DW-NOMINATE score of 0.5, while Bill Clinton, who nominated 
Ginsburg, has a score of -0.514. Thus, the absolute distance between 
Stevens’ and Ginsburg’s nominating presidents is 1.014. But the 
ideological medians of the Senates faced by Ford and Clinton were much 
closer, with a score of -0.188 for Stevens and a score of -0.193 for 
Ginsburg. Thus, the distance between the Senates to which Stevens and 
Ginsburg were nominated is a mere 0.005. 
This distance provides “SENDIST” and “PRESDIST” variables that 
can be compared to paired agreement rates for all Justices.159 The variables 
measure whether Justices’ rates of agreement are predicted by ideologies 
of presidents or Senates at the time of their nominations. Returning to the 
example above, note that Stevens and Ginsburg agreed at a high rate of 
76%. This is not a result one would expect, given that they were 
nominated by ideologically distant presidents. But it can be explained by 
the fact that their nominating presidents faced ideologically proximate 
Senates. 
D. Hypotheses and Regression Analysis 
This study uses regression analysis to identify the relationships among 
agreement rates, ideologies of Justices’ nominating presidents, and 
ideologies of Senates faced by those presidents. It may be, for example, 
that Justices agree along apolitical lines that cannot be generally explained 
by either ideologies of their nominating presidents or Senates faced by 
these presidents. It may be that senatorial ideology predicts how Justices 
vote: Justices agree more with Justices whose nominating presidents faced 
ideologically similar Senates and less with Justices whose nominating 
presidents faced ideologically distant Senates.160 Or presidential ideology 
may predict agreement rates along similar lines. 
The regression identifies not only whether senatorial or presidential 
ideology predict Justices’ agreement rates, but how confident one should 
be that a predictive relationship reflects something other than “mere 
chance” or random variation in Justices’ behavior.161 This allows one to 
 
 159. As explained infra in Part II.E.3, regression analysis accounts for pairs of Justices whose 
nominating presidents or Senates have identical scores, and thus a PRESDIST or a SENDIST of zero. 
Pairs of Justices for whom PRESDIST or SENDIST is zero do not drop out of the regression, but 
instead their agreement rates are compared to agreement rates of other pairs for whom PRESDIST or 
SENDIST is greater than zero. 
 160. Justice Stevens’ voting patterns are described above. See supra note 14 and accompanying text. 
 161. Michael O. Finkelstein, Basic Concepts of Probability and Statistics in the Law 53–54 
(2009) (describing the concept of statistical significance in regression analysis). All significant results in 
this study satisfy standard 1% or 5% confidence levels. Id. These levels mean that in a very high 
percentage of cases (99% or 95%, respectively) the regression will correctly identify a predictive 
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test a number of hypotheses about the Senate’s constraint on presidents’ 
choices of nominees: 
(1) Holding presidents’ ideologies fixed, Justices whose nominating 
presidents faced ideologically proximate Senates vote together 
more often than Justices whose nominating presidents faced 
ideologically distant Senates. 
(2) The Senate’s ideology predicts Justices’ rates of agreement in one 
or more distinct historical time periods. 
(3) The Senate’s ideology predicts agreement rates of Justices 
nominated from 1950–1970, or the time when the Senate adopted 
its routine practice of requiring nominees to appear before the 
Judiciary Committee. 
(4) The Senate’s ideology predicts agreement rates of Justices 
nominated from 1970–1990, or the period after it used its first-ever 
filibuster against a Supreme Court nominee. 
(5) The Senate’s ideology predicts agreement rates of Justices 
nominated from 1990–2010, or the period after its rejection of 
Robert Bork. 
E. Regression Analysis 
This study reports results of four regressions. The first regression 
considers the general relationships among agreement rates and 
presidential and senatorial ideology across all Justices.162 The second and 
third regressions incorporate time dummy variables to identify whether 
different relationships are present in distinct time periods.163 The last 
 
relationship between ideology and agreement rates. Id. Other results may identify a relationship 
between ideology and agreement rates, but the standard error will be too great to confidently reject 
the possibility that the relationship reflects only random variation in voting patterns. Such 
relationships are statistically indistinguishable from zero. 
 162. I estimate the following regression to measure predictive power of presidential and senatorial 
ideology for agreement rates of all Justices in my study: 
(Agree_Rate)i,j = i + 1*PRESDISTi,j + 2* SENDISTi,j + , 
where (Agree_Rate)i,j is the percentage of cases in which Justice i and Justice j joined the same 
majority or minority coalition on the judgment, PRESDISTi,j is the absolute distance between the DW-
NOMINATE scores of the president that nominated Justice i and the president that nominated Justice 
j, and SENDISTi,j is the absolute distance between the DW-NOMINATE scores of the median 
Senators at the time of nomination for Justice i and Justice j. The intercept (i) is allowed to vary 
across Justices. 
 163. The second and third regressions add time dummy variables to the initial regression. The 
second regression (twenty-year time dummy variables) is: 
(Agree_Rate)i,j = i+ 1*PRESDISTi,j + 2*(PRESDISTi,j)(1890_1910) + 
3*(PRESDISTi,j)(1910_1930) + 4*(PRESDISTi,j)(1930_1950) + 
5*(PRESDISTi,j)(1950_1970) + 6*(PRESDISTi,j)(1970_1990) + 
7*(PRESDISTi,j)(1970_1990)+8*SENDISTi,j + 9*(SENDISTi,j)(1890_1910) + 
10*(SENDISTi,j)(1910_1930) + 11*(SENDISTi,j)(1930_1950) + 
12*(SENDISTi,j)(1950_1970) + 13*(SENDISTi,j)( 1970_1990) + 
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regression, which is reported in Appendix A, considers whether ideologies 
of Senators who represent the Senate’s filibuster pivot, rather than 
ideologies of median members of the Senate, have predictive power over 
Justices’ votes.164 
1. Regression Specifications 
Because the dependent variable reflects rates of agreement rather 
than binary (0 or 1) outcomes, the study uses OLS regressions.165 The 
regressions are multivariate, meaning that they take both explanatory 
variables of senatorial ideology and presidential ideology into account. A 
regression considering predictive power of presidential or senatorial 
ideology alone could be misleading because it might overlook the fact 
that presidential and senatorial ideology are sometimes correlated. Thus a 
regression taking both factors into account can decompose the variation in 
agreement rates into separate presidential and senatorial coefficients. 
Coefficients identify the relationship between each explanatory variable 
and agreement rates, quantifying change in agreement rates predicted by 
difference in presidential or senatorial ideology. 
The regressions also incorporate two additional adjustments to 
account for idiosyncratic voting patterns that may vary from Justice to 
Justice. First, they use fixed effect specifications to measure each Justice’s 
patterns of agreement with other Justices. This accounts for different 
overall levels of agreeability among different Justices. For example, Justice 
Clarke agreed with all other Justices only 52% of the time, while Justice 
Blatchford agreed with all other Justices 78% of the time.166 An agreement 
rate of 67% might show ideological compatibility for Justice Clarke 
(indeed, this was his rate of agreement with Justice Brandeis). But the 
same rate might show ideological incompatibility for Justice Blatchford, as 
he generally agreed with other Justices more than 67% of the time.167 Thus, 
 
14*(SENDISTi,j)(1990_2010) +
The third regression(event time dummy variables) is: 
(Agree_Rate)i,j = i + 1*PRESDISTi,j + 2*(PRESDISTi,j)(WAR_DUM) + 
3*(PRESDISTi,j)(FIL_DUM) + 4*(PRESDISTi,j)(BORK_DUM) + 5*SENDISTi,j + 
6*(SENDISTi,j)(WAR_DUM) + 9*(SENDISTi,j)(FIL_DUM) + 
10*(SENDISTi,j)(BORK_DUM) +  
 164. A table reporting coefficients and standard errors for all regressions in the study is included in 
Appendix B. 
 165. OLS stands for “ordinary least squares.” Finkelstein, supra note 161, at 137. The OLS 
regression is a linear model. Id. It identifies a line that best fits all data points and minimizes the sum 
of squared differences between the line and data points. Id. 
 166. See Chabot & Chabot, supra note 8, at 1029 fig.9, 1032 fig.10. 
 167. Id.  
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a measure based on average levels of agreeability for each Justice could be 
far off as a measure of ideological compatibility for all Justices.168 
A fixed effect specification solves the problem by directing the 
regression to calculate a unique starting point (or intercept) from which 
to consider variation in each Justice’s rates of agreement.169 Thus, it 
considers whether Clarke agreed with Brandeis more or less than he 
agreed with other Justices with whom he sat, and whether Blatchford 
agreed with Brown more or less than he agreed with other Justices with 
whom he sat. Over these customized starting points for each Justice, the 
regression fixes a uniform estimate (or coefficient) reflecting change in 
agreement rates relative to changes in ideological distances between 
presidents and Senates at the time of nomination. 
Next, the analysis controls for the idiosyncratic voting patterns of 
different Justices by computing clustered standard errors. Standard 
errors are reported in all regressions and reflect how confident one can 
be that the regression coefficients account for relationships identified by 
all data points. Here, the data points do not reflect agreement rates for 
969 unique pairs of Justices, but data points for pairs in which each 
Justice shows up multiple times.170 For Alito, to illustrate, the study 
considers paired voting records between Alito and Sotomayor, Alito and 
Roberts, Alito and Breyer, and so on. The concern is that unobservable 
factors other than presidential or senatorial ideology may influence an 
individual Justice’s voting and result in errors that vary unevenly from 
Justice to Justice. 
If Chief Justice William Taft had an unusually rich diet that 
influenced his voting behavior, for example, his votes may be more 
erratic than those of his colleagues. Clustered standard errors adjust for 
unobservable differences in voting behavior that vary from Justice to 
 
 168. A particular concern with comparing earlier voting records to later voting records is that the 
Court’s percentages of non-unanimous decisions have increased significantly since the 1940s. Robert 
Post, The Supreme Court Opinion as Institutional Practice: Dissent, Legal Scholarship, and 
Decisionmaking in the Taft Court, 85 Minn. L. Rev. 1267, 1310 (2001). Some scholars attribute the 
change to deteriorating norms of consensus on the Court. Id. This study avoids many cases affected by 
changing norms of consensus by considering only non-unanimous decisions where there was no 
consensus among all Justices, and if norms of consensus led earlier Justices to higher overall levels of 
agreeability even in non-unanimous cases, the fixed effect specification controls for this difference. 
 169. I included the fixed effect specification by hand coding binary fixed effect dummy variables 
and adding them to the data used in the regression. 
 170. Clustered standard errors adjust for heteroskedasticity, or the possibility of uneven variance 
in unobservable factors for each Justice. Code to calculate clustered standard errors on a fixed effect 
regression in MATLAB is described in Ian D. Gow et al., Correcting for Cross-Sectional and Time-
Series Dependence in Accounting Research, 85 Acct. Rev. 483, 495 n.7 (2010). For more information 
on this technique, see id. I coded data for this regression in Excel, converted it to a text file, and then 
ran regressions on the text files using MATLAB. 
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Justice. They group standard errors around changes in agreement rates 
for each individual Justice, rather than lumping all errors together and 
considering them with respect to changes in agreement rates across all 
Justices in the study. This specification requires the data to pass a more 
difficult test before accepting a relationship between Justices’ votes and 
presidential or senatorial ideology as statistically significant. This more 
difficult test enhances confidence that significance of any relationship 
identified in the regression is not distorted by the idiosyncratic voting 
patterns of individual Justices. 
2. Time Dummy Variables 
A constant measure over time of the relationship between agreement 
rates and senatorial ideology may obscure the Senate’s role during distinct 
time periods. This study incorporates time dummy variables to identify the 
explanatory power of the Senate’s ideology in distinct historical time 
periods. The time dummies allow predictive power for presidential and 
senatorial ideology to vary across particular time periods. 
This study relies on two sets of time dummy variables to evaluate 
change over time. The first set groups data into voting records for 
Justices appointed during discrete twenty-year time periods. A longer 
time period might fail to identify predictive power evident in a limited 
number of years, and a smaller time period (or even voting records for 
each individual Justice) would rely on samples of underlying data that 
are too small to yield statistically significant results. Still, the twenty-year 
periods themselves do not line up precisely with events thought to mark 
important shifts in the Senate’s role, such as its first-ever use of the 
filibuster against Abe Fortas in 1968, or its controversial rejection of 
Robert Bork in 1987. The second set of time dummy variables accounts 
for this by grouping voting records around the three key events thought 
to mark changes in the Senate’s role in the latter part of the twentieth 
century.  
The first set of time dummy variables break historical voting records 
into seven groups. The groups reflect appointments made in distinct 
twenty year periods: 
Group (1): Before 1890 (Justices Swayne through Brewer); 
Group (2): 1890_1910 (Justices Brown through Lurton); 
Group (3): 1910_1930 (Justices Hughes through Stone); 
Group (4): 1930_1950 (Justices Black through Minton);171 
Group (5): 1950_1970 (Justices Warren through Burger); 
 
 171. I begin with Justice Black because Herbert Hoover’s appointees could not be included in the 
study. They were excluded because there are no presidential DW-NOMINATE scores for Herbert 
Hoover. 
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Group (6): 1970_1990 (Justices Blackmun through Kennedy); and 
Group (7): 1990_2010 (Justices Souter through Sotomayor).172 
The study uses 0 or 1 dummy variables to identify interaction 
between agreement rates and presidential or senatorial ideology for 
particular Justices. The first group, Justices appointed from Swayne 
through Brewer, does not receive a time dummy variable. This is because 
these Justices are used as a baseline from which to compare relationships 
in other time periods. 
For all later groups, the study codes each dummy variable according 
to a single Justice’s paired agreements with all other Justices with whom 
he or she sits. For example, the data include agreement rates for 
Sotomayor and all other Justices with whom she sits, then agreement 
rates for Alito and other Justices with whom he sits, etc. Both Sotomayor 
and Alito were appointed during the 1990–2010 period (Group (7)). I 
assign a 1 or 0 according to the first Justice in the pair, so that the 
Sotomayor and Alito pairs receive a 1 for “1990_2010,” and a 0 for all 
other time dummy variables. 
The regression multiplies the time dummies for each group by 
SENDIST and PRESDIST variables.173 The interaction between these 
variables measures whether there is a significant difference between 
predictive power of presidential or senatorial ideology over agreement 
rates in distinct time periods. Specifically, it compares the relationship 
between these variables for Justices in Group (1) to the relationship 
between these variables for Justices in a later group whose paired voting 
records are identified by “1” dummy variables.174 
The interaction coefficient reported by the regression allows me to 
calculate the total predictive power of senatorial or presidential ideology 
for a time period covered in Groups (2)–(7), by adding the coefficient for 
Group (1) to the interaction coefficient of each Group. (The coefficients 
for Group (1) reflect the relationships between ideologies and agreement 
rates for Justices appointed during that period; the interaction coefficient 
 
 172. The 1962–2009 voting records used for this study do not include Justice Kagan. See supra note 
144. 
 173. See supra note 163. 
 174. If the effect of distance between presidents or Senates changes for Justices appointed in 
certain historical periods, it will show up in the data as a significant coefficient on the interaction 
variables. To see this, note that the expected change in agreement rate for a change in presidential 
distance is the general PRESDIST coefficient during the time periods when the dummy variable is 
equal to zero and the PRESDIST coefficient plus the PRESDIST interaction coefficient during the 
time periods that the dummy variable is equal to one. A formal test of the null hypothesis that the 
influence of the president did not change is therefore equivalent to a test of the null hypothesis that 
the PRESDIST coefficient = PRESDIST coefficient + PRESDIST interaction coefficient, or that the 
PRESDIST interaction coefficient = 0. 
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reflects the difference in these relationships for Justices appointed during 
the later period.) Thus, total predictive power for 1890–1910 equals the 
sum of interaction coefficients of Group (1) and Group (2).175 The same 
procedure is followed to calculate total levels of predictive power for 
Groups (3) through (7). Coefficients reported for distinct time periods 
below reflect calculations of total predictive power for the time period 
covered by each group. 
The study uses another set of time dummy variables to address how 
the Senate’s role or the appointments process may have shifted in 
response to key events occurring in the latter half of the twentieth 
century. Group (A) focuses on Justices appointed before the 1950s, and 
Group (B) focuses on Justices appointed after the Senate adopted the 
routine practice of asking nominees to appear before the Senate 
Judiciary Committee.176 Group (C) focuses on Justices appointed after 
the Fortas filibuster, and Group (D) focuses on Justices appointed after 
Bork’s failed nomination. If any of these events enhanced the Senate’s 
power, one would expect its ideology to have more predictive power over 
voting patterns of Justices appointed after they occurred. 
Each group reflects paired voting records for the following Justices: 
Group (A):  Pre-Warren (Justices appointed before Warren) 
Group (B): WAR_DUM (Justices Warren through Marshall) 
Group (C): FILI_DUM (Justices Burger through Scalia) 
Group (D):  BORK_DUM (Justices Kennedy through Sotomayor) 
Again, Group A does not receive a time dummy variable because it sets 
a baseline for comparison to later groups. Time dummy variables for 
Groups (B)–(D) reflect the same coding conventions and calculations of 
total predictive power above described for the twenty-year time dummy 
variables. 
3. Expected Results 
As mentioned above, it may be that Justices’ agreement rates reflect 
independent voting patterns which cannot be explained by presidential 
 
 175. I also needed to calculate new confidence levels for sum of two coefficients. This involved a 
multi-step process. First, Variance(a + b) = Variance(a) + Variance (b) + 2*Co-variance(a,b). See 
generally Jeffrey M. Wooldridge, Introductory Econometrics: A Modern Approach 140–41 (2008). 
The standard error is the square root of this estimated variance, and the t-stat is (a + b)/SE(a + b). 
The t-stat can then be converted into a p-value, reflecting confidence levels reported in this study. 
 176. Commentators list Harlan’s testimony in 1955 as the precise date of this change. See 
Gerhardt, supra note 3, at 68; Wittes, supra note 6, at 64–65; Stone, supra note 5, at 427. However, a 
1955 cutoff would require me to exclude Justice Warren and consider an incomplete group of 
Eisenhower appointees. Including Warren gives the Senate the benefit of the doubt, as he was a 
divided government appointee who disappointed Eisenhower. See Chabot & Chabot, supra note 8, at 
1019 tbl.2. As explained below, even with this favorable presumption the Senate did not increase its 
power starting in the 1950s. 
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or senatorial ideology. In this case the regression will yield coefficients 
that are either zero or statistically indistinguishable from zero for both of 
these explanatory variables. In other words, ideologies of nominating 
presidents or Senates these presidents face will not predict a significant 
change in Justices’ agreement rates. 
If either senatorial or presidential ideologies predict rates of 
agreement, however, the regression will yield a significant negative 
coefficient for the senatorial or presidential variable. The expected 
coefficient, or predicted change in agreement rates, is negative for the 
following reason: Justices whose votes can be explained by ideologies of 
presidents or Senates to which they are nominated will agree less with 
Justices whose presidents or Senates are more ideologically distant. 
To illustrate, consider what voting patterns one might expect if 
either presidential or senatorial ideology predicts rates of agreement. A 
presidential ideology explanation holds that a pair of Justices appointed 
by close presidents, such as Reagan and George H.W. Bush, will agree at 
a high rate, as do Scalia and Thomas. Then, where ideological distance 
between presidents is greater, such as distance between Reagan and 
Clinton, rates of agreement should be lower, as they are for Scalia and 
Ginsburg. If presidential ideology has no predictive power, Justices 
appointed by close presidents like Reagan and Bush will agree with one 
another about as often as they agree with Justices appointed by distant 
presidents like Reagan and Clinton. 
Of course, sometimes senatorial ideology has predictive power that 
presidential ideology lacks. Stevens, for example, is a Ford appointee 
who agreed more with Clinton appointees (Ginsburg and Breyer) than 
Reagan appointees (O’Connor, Scalia, and Kennedy). But the Senate 
that confirmed Stevens was just about as liberal as the Senates that 
confirmed Ginsburg and Breyer.177 Stevens’ Senate was far more liberal 
than the Senates that confirmed O’Connor and Scalia.178 Here, Stevens 
agrees less with Justices whose nominating presidents faced Senates that 
were more conservative than the one Ford faced in nominating Stevens. 
Senatorial ideology explains Stevens’ voting patterns. If senatorial 
ideology has no predictive power, however, then Justices like Stevens will 
agree with Justices like Ginsburg and Breyer about as much as they agree 
with Justices like O’Connor and Scalia. 
Finally, regression analysis accounts for pairs of Justices whose 
presidents or Senates have identical scores, and thus a PRESDIST or a 
SENDIST of zero.179 This is because agreement rates for these pairs are 
 
 177. See Justices Database, supra note 29. 
 178. Id. And it was somewhat more liberal than the Senate to which Kennedy was nominated. Id. 
 179.  There are sixty-eight Justice pairs with a SENDIST of zero and 160 Justice pairs with a 
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always compared to agreement rates of other pairs for whom PRESDIST 
or SENDIST is greater than zero. Assume nominations where a 
conservative president faces a very liberal Senate (Stevens) and a liberal 
president faces to an almost equally liberal Senate (Ginsburg). Even if 
Stevens’ and Ginsburg’s presidents faced identical Senates with a 
SENDIST of zero, their percentages of agreement factor into the 
relationship reported by the regression. The Senate would have 
explanatory power over Stevens’ voting, for example, if he agreed with 
Ginsburg and others like her (Breyer) more than other Justices 
nominated by conservative presidents facing conservative Senates (such 
as O’Connor and Reagan or Alito and Roberts). 
F. Results 
As illustrated by Figure 1, the initial regression shows that senatorial 
ideology fails to significantly predict Justices’ rates of agreement. 
Presidential ideology, on the other hand, has significant predictive power 
over Justices’ rates of agreement. 
 
PRESDIST of zero. Every time SENDIST is zero, PRESDIST is also zero. There were some times 
where the same president faced different Senates throughout his time in office, leading to a 
PRESDIST of zero with a SENDIST of more than zero. 
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Figure 1: Predictive Power of Presidential and 
Senatorial Ideology over Agreement Rates180 
The results fail to support my first hypothesis. Holding presidential 
ideology fixed, Justices whose presidents faced ideologically proximate 
Senates do not agree significantly more than Justices whose presidents 
faced ideologically distant Senates. The standard error is too great to 
confidently identify a relationship between agreement rates and senatorial 
ideology, and the relationship is statistically indistinguishable from zero. 
Thus, senatorial ideology fails to significantly predict how Justices vote. 
 
 180. Estimated with all Justices appointed from Swayne through Sotomayor (and for whom 
nominating presidents have DW-NOMINATE scores). *** denotes a 1% confidence level, and the white 
bar denotes results statistically indistinguishable from zero. Confidence levels are calculated using 
clustered standard errors; for an explanation of confidence levels, see supra note 161. Change in 
agreement rates is predicted difference in agreement rates per 1 unit of difference in presidential DW-
NOMINATE scores and per 0.1 unit of difference in senatorial DW-NOMINATE scores. N=969. 
 The study reports change in agreement rates per 1 unit of difference in presidential DW-
NOMINATE scores and per 0.1 unit of difference in senatorial DW-NOMINATE scores. These different 
scales reflect the fact that differences in scores for median Senators fluctuate within a much smaller range, 
0.619 to zero, than differences in scores for nominating presidents, which range from 1.44 to zero. For 
example, ideologically distant presidents may have DW-NOMINATE scores about one unit apart (as 
noted above, Clinton and Ford were 1.14 units apart). Spreads for the Senate are never this large. The 
very different Senates to which Stevens and Scalia were nominated, for example, have median Senators 
with scores of -0.188 and -0.014, respectively. Thus their scores are only 0.174 units apart. See Justices 
Database, supra note 29. 
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Presidential ideology, on the other hand, predicts a significant 
negative change in agreement rates. One can be highly confident, at the 
1% level,181 that this relationship is not merely the product of random 
variation in voting patterns. There is strong evidence that, on average, 
Justices nominated by ideologically proximate presidents vote together 
at higher rates than those appointed by ideologically distant presidents. 
This result shows that ideological proximity of nominating presidents 
has significant predictive power over Justices’ votes, while ideological 
distance between Senates does not have the same significant 
relationship.182 It is consistent with findings suggesting lack of senatorial 
constraint in my earlier work.183 And it fails to support a general 
understanding of senatorial constraint across the entire time period. 
Results for the second regression add nuance by considering the 
predictive power of the Senate and president’s ideology in distinct time 
periods. Because the overall results show that presidential ideology has 
more significant predictive power than senatorial ideology, the regression 
results are first presented showing the president’s role in distinct time 
periods. The associations between presidential ideology and Justices’ 
agreement rates provide a helpful baseline from which to consider results 
for the Senate. 
Figure 2 shows that presidential ideology did not significantly predict 
Justices’ agreement rates in any period before 1970. But after 1970, the 
president’s ideology maintained significant predictive power over 
agreement rates. 
One of the most striking results, consistent with the overall findings 
above, is that the president’s ideology gained predictive power over time. 
In the first five historical periods, spanning years 1862–1970,184 the 
predictive power of the president’s ideology is statistically insignificant.185 
 
 181. For an explanation of confidence levels, see supra note 161.  
 182. I ran a separate regression to account for the possibility that filibusters may lead presidents to 
select Justices closer to the filibuster pivot (currently the sixtieth-most liberal or conservative Senator) 
than to the Senate median. As reported in Appendix A: Alternative Measure of Senatorial Ideology, 
infra, this measure also fails to identify senatorial influence. 
 183. Chabot & Chabot, supra note 8, at 1019 tbl.2. 
 184. The Judges of 1925 changed the Court’s jurisdiction in ways that allowed it to hear a greater 
percentage of politically divisive cases than before. See generally Halpern & Vines, supra note 144. It 
may be that this change in the menu of cases before the Court, rather than enhanced ability of 
presidents or Senates to seat ideologically compatible Justices, led to political voting patterns 
identified here. In this case, however, the post-1925 changes in jurisdiction do not offer a likely 
explanation for the study’s results. Presidential ideology did not gain significant explanatory power 
over Justices’ votes until many decades after 1925. Further, as explained below, any gains in the 
predictive power of Senatorial ideology around this time vanished by the 1950s. Thus, changes in 
politically predictable voting do not seem to have occurred around the same time the Court’s 
jurisdiction changed. 
 185. Although the predicted change in agreement for 1930–1950 seems large (-0.105), the standard 
error surrounding this finding (0.0763) is also too large to be confident that the predicted change is not 
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But the coefficient showing predictive power of presidential ideology 
then increases to negative 7% after 1970 and negative 11% after 1990. 
These levels of predictive power in the latter periods are significantly 
different than zero at the standard 5% confidence level. One can 
confidently reject the null hypothesis that presidential ideology is 
unrelated to agreement rates for these periods. 
Figure 2: Predictive Power of Presidential Ideology for 
Agreement Rates over Time (Twenty-Year Time Dummy Variables)186 
The enhanced predictive power coincides with a period where 
Nixon and Reagan prioritized ideology in their appointments to the 
bench.187 Although in the 1990s, Bush and Clinton may not have placed 
the same emphasis on ideology, by this point they may have been better 
able to predict how their nominees would vote. Like the Reagan 
administration, they had access to enhanced technology allowing them to 
find and analyze nominees’ past writings using computerized databases.188 
 
in fact zero. See infra Appendix B. 
 186. Estimated with all Justices appointed from Swayne through Sotomayor (and for whom 
nominating presidents have DW-NOMINATE scores). ** denotes a 5% confidence level, and white 
bars denote results statistically indistinguishable from zero. Confidence levels are calculated using 
clustered standard errors. Change in agreement rates is predicted difference in agreement rates per 1 
unit of difference in presidential DW-NOMINATE scores. N=969. 
 187. See Yalof, supra note 14, at 169–70. 
 188. See supra note 138 and surrounding discussion. 
May 2013]   INFLUENCE OVER COURT APPOINTMENTS 1263 
 
Figure 3: Predictive Power of Senatorial Ideology for Agreement 
Rates over Time (Twenty-Year Time Dummy Variables)189 
Given evidence that presidential ideology has become a significant 
predictor of Justices’ agreement rates since 1970, the remaining questions 
are whether the Senate’s role evolved along a similar timeline and whether 
the Senate held its ground against an increasingly powerful executive. 
Figure 3 shows a strong association between senatorial ideology and 
agreement rates during certain historical and recent periods. But it also 
shows that the Senate’s ideology has not consistently maintained 
significant predictive power over time, and that its predictive power was 
statistically indistinguishable from zero for Justices appointed after 1990. 
Predictive power of the Senate’s ideology is statistically 
indistinguishable from zero before 1890, and it gains some significance 
from 1890–1910. Lack of more significant power before 1910 may seem 
surprising, given accounts of an aggressive Senate in the nineteenth 
century.190 It may be that confirmation politics in the nineteenth century 
turned on the parochial concerns of individual Senators191 and that those 
 
 189. Estimated with all Justices appointed from Swayne through Sotomayor (and for whom 
nominating presidents have DW-NOMINATE scores). ** denotes a 5% confidence level, * denotes a 
10% confidence level, and white bars denote results statistically indistinguishable from zero. Confidence 
levels are calculated using clustered standard errors. Change in agreement rates is predicted difference in 
agreement rates per 0.1 unit of difference in senatorial DW-NOMINATE scores. 
 190. See Whittington, supra note 35, at 430–33. 
 191. See id. at 430–31 (noting the role played by “claims of prerogative of individual senators” in 
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views are not well reflected in Senate medians used to measure senatorial 
ideology. Also, the pre-1890 time period excludes five appointees192 
because there are no presidential DW-NOMINATE scores for these 
Justices. As explained in Part III.C, one cannot reliably measure 
predictive power of senatorial ideology without considering presidential 
ideology at the same time. 
In any event, things changed markedly from 1910–1930, as the 
Senate’s ideology significantly predicted change in agreement rates of 
Justices appointed during this period. This supports my second hypothesis 
of predictive power in a distinct historical period. It is consistent with 
Epstein and Segal’s account of a historically aggressive Senate, as reflected 
in events such as the pitched political battle over Louis Brandeis’ 
confirmation in 1916. 
The Senate’s ideology did not maintain its significance. Although its 
predictive power is indistinguishable from zero by the 1930–1950 period, 
this period again reflects an incomplete set of Justices. It does not include 
voting records for Owen Roberts (appointed in 1930) and Benjamin 
Cardozo (appointed in 1932) because there are no presidential DW-
NOMINATE scores available for these Justices.193 Hoover nominated 
Roberts after the Senate rejected his earlier nomination of John Parker, 
and he faced senatorial pressure to select Cardozo to replace the vacancy 
left by Oliver Wendell Holmes.194 Thus, analysis based on more complete 
data might show a different result. 
In any event, results for the 1950–1970 time period include all 
appointees, and they offer no reason to think the Senate’s ideology 
maintained any of its earlier significance. Indeed, the Senate coefficient 
for this time period is not only indistinguishable from zero, but it is 
positive. This suggests that, if anything, Justices whose presidents faced 
ideologically distant Senates voted together more than Justices whose 
presidents faced ideologically proximate Senates. Thus, voting records 
provide no evidence of senatorial constraint in the period post-Brown 
where the Senate adopted a routine practice of grilling nominees about 
their substantive views.195 This result does not support my third 
hypothesis that the Senate’s ideology gained predictive power from 
1950–1970. It offers no reason to think that more aggressive confirmation 
 
nineteenth-century confirmation politics). 
 192. L.Q. Lamar, Fuller, Matthews, Woods, and Harlan I. 
 193. Presidential DW-NOMINATE scores for Hoover’s first appointee, Chief Justice Charles 
Evan Hughes, are based on Hughes’ initial appointment by President William Taft. 
 194. See Bernard Schwartz, A History of the Supreme Court 228–29 (1993); see also Henry J. 
Abraham, Justices, Presidents, and Senators: A History of the U.S. Supreme Court Appointments 
from Washington to Bush II 153–54 (5th ed. 2008). 
 195. See Wittes, supra note 6, at 61. 
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practices drove presidents to better accommodate the Senate’s policy 
preferences in nomination decisions. 
But the Senate’s ideology again displayed enhanced significance by 
the 1970s. Here the Senate’s predicted change in agreement rates has a 
negative coefficient that is significantly different than zero at the 5% 
confidence level. Ideological proximity between Senates predicts 
agreement rates for Justices appointed during this time period. On 
average, Justices nominated by presidents facing ideologically proximate 
Senates voted together more than Justices whose presidents faced Senates 
that were far apart. 
This result supports my fourth hypothesis of an enhanced predictive 
power starting in the 1970s. It is consistent with accounts describing how 
a more politicized appointments process emerged by the late 1960s. For 
example, Silverstein describes this time period as one with change 
wrought by increased political pressures stemming from the changing 
nature of judicial power and the involvement of powerful interest 
groups.196 Formal interest group participation in confirmation hearings 
started to become a staple by the Fortas filibuster in 1968.197 Senators 
also operated under new norms where it was no longer safe to simply 
conform to the expectations of peers and accept the president’s choice.198 
Instead, each Senator now faced significant electoral consequences in 
voting for or against a particular nominee.199 
The Senate’s ideology gained significance at a time when 
commentators assert the Senate assumed a more aggressive and politicized 
role in confirmation proceedings.200 Davis states that calls “for Senate 
assertiveness in the nomination process began with Republican Senators 
during the unsuccessful confirmation effort for Abe Fortas as chief justice 
in 1968.”201 The Senate went on to reject Nixon’s nominations of Clement 
Haynsworth, Jr., and G. Harrold Carswell.202 Silverstein posits that this 
more aggressive role compelled presidents to choose nominees who would 
minimize political opposition to their confirmation.203 And indeed, for 
Justices nominated immediately after these actions, agreement rates 
reflect the ideology of Senates faced by nominating presidents. 
 
 196. Silverstein, supra note 72, at 153–54. 
 197. See Nemacheck, supra note 20, at 48 (citing Jeffrey A. Segal et al., A Spatial Model of Roll 
Call Voting: Senators, Constituents, Presidents, and Interest Groups in Supreme Court Confirmations, 
36 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 96 (1992)). 
 198. Silverstein, supra note 72, at 152–56. 
 199. Id. 
 200. See id. at 12. 
 201. Davis, supra note 33, at 20–21.  
 202. Supreme Court Nominations, supra note 7. 
 203. See Silverstein, supra note 72, at 100. 
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Most surprising, however, are results for the most recent time period, 
1990 through 2010. Though the regression still predicts a decrease in 
agreement rates as distances between senatorial ideology increase, the 
coefficient on the predicted change shrinks dramatically. The error 
surrounding this finding is too great to be confident that the Senate’s true 
predictive power is not zero. Thus, the regression fails to support my fifth 
hypothesis that the Senate’s ideology had predictive power from 1990–
2010 or after its rejection of Robert Bork in 1987. It does not allow one 
to confidently conclude that the Senate’s ideology maintained the 
significant predictive power it had in the 1970s. If presidents continued 
taking senatorial ideology into account, this practice did not manifest 
itself in appointees with voting records which significantly reflected the 
Senate’s ideology. 
These results are consistent with observations that the Senate’s 
rejection of Bork was a one-time success that could not be repeated.204 To 
be sure, rejecting Bork had short run benefits and kept at least one 
extreme candidate off the Court. But in the long run the Senate’s 
controversial strategy may have backfired. Future nominees had 
tremendous incentives to avoid being as forthcoming as Bork at 
confirmation hearings. The event may have also raised the political 
stakes and fortified the resolve of powerful executives—whose ideology 
maintained a significant level of predictive power after the 1990s. 
Still, the fixed twenty-year time periods considered above may not 
adequately capture appointments occurring immediately after events 
such as the Fortas filibuster or Bork’s rejection. My final regression 
accounts for this possibility by using a second set of time dummy 
variables. These variables break data into different time periods 
reflecting three key events thought to mark significant shifts in the 
Senate’s role since the 1950s: (1) the Senate’s routine requirement that 
nominees appear before the Senate Judiciary Committee starting in the 
1950s, (2) the Senate’s first ever use of the filibuster against a Supreme 
Court nominee—Fortas for Chief Justice—in 1968, and (3) Bork’s failed 
nomination. 
The results, however, echo my earlier findings. Presidential ideology 
has some predictive power after the Fortas filibuster, and it gains 
significant predictive power after the Senate’s rejection of Bork. The 
Senate’s ideology gains significant predictive power after the Fortas 
filibuster but again fails to maintain its significance post-Bork. 
 
 204. See generally Eisgruber, supra note 11; Kagan, supra note 126. 
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Figure 4: Predictive Power of Presidential Ideology for 









Figure 5: Predictive Power of Senatorial Ideology for 
Agreement Rates over Time (Event Time Dummy Variables)206 
 
 
 205. Both charts report the result of a single regression calculated for all Justices appointed from 
Swayne through Sotomayor (and for whom nominating presidents have DW-NOMINATE scores). 
* denotes a 10% confidence level, *** denotes a 1% confidence level, and the white bars denote 
results statistically indistinguishable from zero. Confidence levels are calculated using clustered 
standard errors. Change in agreement rates is predicted difference in agreement rates per 1 unit of 
difference in presidential DW-NOMINATE scores and per 0.1 unit of difference in senatorial DW-
NOMINATE scores. N=969. 
 206. See supra note 205. 
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Conclusion 
Overall, the Senate’s ideology has had little predictive power over 
the voting behavior of Justices it confirms. Presidential ideology, on the 
other hand, significantly predicts agreement rates across all 969 pairs of 
Justices. Although the Senate’s ideology significantly predicted Justices’ 
agreements during two isolated historical periods, it never maintained a 
consistent level of predictive power over time. 
Analysis of an extended historical period shows that votes cast by 
earlier Justices were not completely unrelated to political forces 
surrounding their appointments. Senatorial ideology had some predictive 
power over agreement rates of Justices appointed from 1890–1910, and it 
had significant predictive power over agreement rates of Justices 
appointed from 1910–1930. But the association between senatorial 
ideology and Justices’ agreement rates did not persist over time. 
Any gains the Senate made from 1910–1930 were no longer evident 
by the 1950s. And although the Senate’s ideology regained significant 
predictive power after the Fortas filibuster and through the early 1980s, it 
again lost significance after Bork’s rejection in 1987. These findings 
substantially qualify earlier accounts of senatorial constraint. 
Taken together, enhanced predictive power of presidential and 
senatorial ideology support the theory that the appointments process has 
become more effectively politicized in recent decades. The 1970s were 
the first time both presidential and senatorial ideology significantly 
explained Justices’ voting patterns. 
Mounting political pressures placed the Supreme Court appointments 
process in an unprecedented spotlight by the time the Senate rejected 
Robert Bork in 1987.207 Voting records of subsequent appointees show that 
presidents generally persisted in efforts to select ideologically compatible 
Justices. Presidents did not continue, however, to select Justices whose 
agreement rates significantly reflected the Senate’s ideology. 
These results are consistent with observations that the Senate’s 
rejection of Bork was a one-time success that could not be repeated.208 
The Senate’s primary weapon, aggressive questioning at confirmation 
hearings, may have been dismantled by evasive nominees who wanted to 
avoid being “Borked.”209 The Senate has deployed other weapons, such as 
delay, to block lower court nominations.210 But these additional weapons 
 
 207. Maltese, supra note 116, at 7; Yalof, supra note 14, at 160 (“The Bork nomination became a 
watershed in terms of interest group involvement in the appointment process.”); see Binder & 
Maltzman, supra note 6, at 7–8 (noting this position); Wittes, supra note 6, at 21 (same). 
 208. Eisgruber, supra note 11, at 156. 
 209. Id. 
 210. Binder & Maltzman, supra note 6, at 5, 16.  
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are not as readily available to Senators who wish to oppose highly 
publicized nominations to the Supreme Court.211 
Presidents, by comparison, faced the political, post-Bork confirmation 
environment with the benefit of new technological resources: 
Computerized databases allowed presidential aides to quickly assemble 
and analyze virtually all of a nominee’s past writings.212 This improved 
information may have better enabled presidents and their staff to 
anticipate not only questions at confirmation hearings, but also the 
nominee’s likely rulings once on the bench. Further, the decision to choose 
nominees almost exclusively from a pool of candidates with prior judicial 
experience213 may have helped presidents exploit this technology to even 
greater advantage. 
The voting records of Justices nominated in this most recent period 
show the Senate has not deterred presidents from appointing Justices 
who reflect presidential ideology. These records fail to identify an 
equally significant role for the Senate in presidents’ choices of nominees. 
Despite the Senate’s power to keep a limited group of nominees off the 
Court, it ultimately failed to constrain presidents to nominate Justices 
who significantly reflected the Senate’s ideology.  
Appendix A: Alternative Measure of Senatorial Ideology 
The results presented in Part III show that the distance between 
median members of the Senate at time of nomination does not generally 
predict agreement levels between pairs of Justices. It is still possible that 
a metric other than distance between median Senators will establish 
senatorial power. 
For example, perhaps the president is more concerned about 
overcoming a filibuster than winning a simple majority of votes. A 
filibuster gives weight to vocal minority interests in the Senate, and thus 
it may lead a president to nominate more moderate candidates even 
though his party controls the Senate. To secure confirmation in the face 
of a filibuster, the president needs to win votes of a supermajority, 
allowing the Senate to invoke cloture and bring the nomination to a vote. 
This might lead the president to select a nominee who is closer to the 
filibuster pivot or last Senator whose vote will secure cloture. In the 
modern Senate, this is the sixtieth-most liberal or conservative Senator. 
 
 211. Id. at 2 (stating that “lower court” nominations are considered “out of the public spotlight” 
and thus give opposing Senators a “far easier time” blocking nominations “surreptitiously by 
exploiting the Senate’s formal rules and informal practices”). 
 212. Yalof, supra note 14, at 17 (discussing advances in legal research technology available to 
“[a]ll modern participants in the appointment process”). 
 213. See generally George, supra note 141. 
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If this is in fact the president’s concern, distance between filibuster pivots 
may have more predictive value than distance between median Senators. 
There is an additional regression exploring this possibility below. 
This additional measure, however, still fails to identify senatorial 
influence beyond what is found in the initial specifications. 
To calculate historical filibuster pivot scores, the study accounts for 
different voting rules the Senate has used over time. The Senate did not 
even have Rule 22, which allows a supermajority to invoke cloture and 
end debate, until 1917.214 Thus, this regression only uses voting pairs in 
which both Justices were appointed after Rule 22 (Justices Taft and 
beyond). Cloture required a two-thirds majority vote from 1917 through 
1975215 and, after that, a three-fifths majority of all Senators duly chosen 
and sworn.216 
The filibuster pivot is calculated based on the DW-NOMINATE 
score217 of the Senator needed to secure the appropriate supermajority 
vote at the time of a Justice’s nomination. The regression uses the 
absolute distance between these filibuster pivots as the independent 
variable measuring the Senate’s ideology. As before, a multivariate 
regression is run, which considers and isolates the effects properly 
attributable to distinct independent variables: (1) distance between 
presidents’ DW-NOMINATE scores218 and (2) distance between DW-
NOMINATE scores for the filibuster pivots at time of nomination. 
 
 214. Filibuster and Cloture, U.S. Senate, http://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/ 
briefing/Filibuster_Cloture.htm (last visited Feb. 25, 2013). 
 215. Rules for calculating the two-thirds majority also fluctuated between Senators duly chosen, 
sworn, present, and voting during this time period. See generally Martin B. Gold & Dimple Gupta, The 
Constitutional Option to Change Senate Rules and Procedures: A Majoritarian Means to Overcome the 
Filibuster, 28 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 206, 226–47 (2004). The study drew a bright line and calculated 
two-thirds based on the entire membership of the Senate for my time period. 
 216. Filibuster and Cloture, supra note 214. 
 217. Scores for each Senator are available in Carroll et al., supra note 30 (Sept. 2011 version). 
 218. Here scores for presidents were drawn from the same release of DW-NOMINATE scores 
used to calculate filibuster pivots. 
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Figure 6: Predictive Power of Presidential Ideology and 
Ideology of Senate Filibuster Pivot over Agreement Rates219 
Again this fails to show evidence of senatorial power. Although the 
point estimate (-0.03) suggests that the filibuster pivot has some 
predictive power over votes, the error surrounding both coefficients is 
too great to be confident that they are not, in fact, zero. 
 
 219. (Agree_Rate)i,j = i + 1*(PRESDIST)+2*(SENFILIDIST) + . Estimated with all Justices 
appointed from Taft through Sotomayor (and for whom nominating presidents have DW-
NOMINATE scores). Confidence levels are calculated using clustered standard errors, and white bars 
denote results statistically indistinguishable from zero. N=536. For a list of excluded Justices, see supra 
note 147. 
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Appendix B: Summary of Regression Results 







    SenDist   SenDist   SenDist   
PresDist -0.0596*** -0.0309 -0.0173 -0.059 
[0.0224] [0.0375] [0.0294] [0.0524] 
PresDist 1890–1910 0.0408 
[0.0282] 
PresDist 1910–30 0.091 
[0.0614] 
PresDist 1930–50 -0.105 
[0.0763] 
PresDist 1950–70 -0.0533 
[0.0667] 
PresDist 1970–1990 -0.0763** 
[0.0379] 
PresDist 1990–2010 -0.1124** 
[0.0444] 
PresDist Post-Warren -0.0394 
[0.0743] 
PresDist Post-Filibuster -0.0773* 
[0.04049] 
PresDist Post Bork -0.1109*** 
[0.0353] 
SenDist -0.0384 -0.00384 -0.018 -0.0018 -0.0835 -0.00835 
[0.0568] [0.0601] [0.0556] 
SenDist (Filibuster Pivot) -0.0394 
[0.0491] 
SenDist 1890–1910 -0.1195* -0.01195 
[0.0627] 
SenDist 1910–30 -0.32** -0.032 
[0.1567] 
SenDist 1930–50 -0.0822 -0.00822 
[0.21] 
SenDist 1950–70 0.197 0.0197 
[0.1525] 
SenDist 1970–1990 -0.4214** -0.4214 
[0.2022] 
SenDist 1990–2010 -0.1836 -0.1836 
[0.2759] 
SenDist Post-Warren 0.236 0.0236 
[0.1530] 
SenDist Post-Filibuster -0.6306*** -0.06306 
[0.1395] 
SenDist Post Bork -0.1334 -0.01334 
[0.2422] 
Adj. R2d 0.1533 0.1724 0.1711 0.1566 
N 969 969 969 536 
 
Clustered standard errors are reported in brackets. Values for time 
interaction coefficients (and accompanying standard errors) reflect the 
total level of predicted change in agreement rates for appointees of a 
given time period. Senate coefficients reported per 0.1 unit in distance 
between DW-NOMINATE scores are noted to the left of coefficients 
per 1 unit of distance. 
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Column 1 reports results for Figure 1,220 Column 2 reports results for 
Figures 2221 and 3,222 Column 3 reports results for Figures 4223 and 5,224 and 
Column 4 reports results for Figure 6.225 * denotes a 10% confidence level, 
** denotes a 5% confidence level, and *** denotes a 1% confidence level. 
 
 220. See supra note 180. 
 221. See supra note 186. 
 222. See supra note 189. 
 223. See supra note 205. 
 224. See supra note 206. 
 225. See supra note 219. 
